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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis consists of three essays in the field of experimental 
economics. The first chapter deals with the choice between three different 
employment contracts from a principal and the implications this choice has 
on the agents’ behaviour. The second chapter investigates experimentally the 
trade-off between risk and incentives as this is described by the incentive 
intensity principle of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Lastly, the third 
chapter investigates whether agents have a drive to obey as a result of social 
image utility towards an authority. 
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Introduction 
 
This PhD thesis consists of three essays on different topics within 
experimental economics. Although each chapter deals with a distinctively different 
research question, there is a broadly defined unifying theme: specifically the 
relationship between principals and agents.. Agency theory has been traditionally 
engaged with problems of hidden action and or hidden information within 
organizations and how to provide incentives in order to align the interests between 
principals and agents. Recent developments in experimental economics have been 
emphasising the importance of taking into account how social preferences may be 
affected adversely  by the use of monetary incentives  (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2000) as well as how incomplete contracts may lead to suboptimal outcomes not 
explained by standard principal agent models (e.g. Fehr et al. 1993). As a result 
new theoretical models have been developed which have tried to incorporate the 
implications of concerns for equity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Englmeier and 
Wambach, 2010), reciprocity (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and social image 
(Sliwka, 2007; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008) into standard principal-agent 
models. 
In the first chapter of my thesis I examine how both intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives can complement each other within a standard principal-agent problem 
of hidden action under complete information. In particular, the principal needs to 
choose between two different employment contracts to offer to an agent; one 
which is based on intrinsic and one on extrinsic motivation. Following Fehr et al. 
(2007), who compared a bonus contract with a monitoring contract, I compare a 
bonus contract with a revenue-sharing contract. The findings are strikingly 
different, with the revenue-sharing contract being the most preferred and most 
efficient contract while is considerably fair as well. In particular, the findings 
suggest that the earnings of both principals and agents are on average larger under 
the incentive contract than when the bonus contract is used but while the profits of 
the agents are on average the same the principal earns considerably more. In other 
words we observe that the principals are ripping the benefits of choosing the 
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incentive contract as their contract choice. Nevertheless, the differences on how 
the surplus is shared between principals‟ and agents‟ are relatively small as, on 
average, the principal earns under the bonus contract the 48% of the net profits 
under the bonus contract and 53% under the incentive contract.   Our results are in 
line with previous findings which suggested that social preferences matter (Fehr et 
al. 1998, Anderhub et al. 2002) but in contrast to findings which suggest that 
extrinsic motivation may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; 
Fehr et al. 2007).  
Whereas in the first chapter I focused on the principal-agent problem under 
no risk, in the second chapter I was interested on testing experimentally the 
theoretical predictions of the Incentive Intensity Principle of Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987). The evidence from previous studies have led to mixed results 
regarding the relationship between intensive intensity and risk (Prendergast, 1999). 
That led some scholars to describe this relationship as „tenuous‟ and to attempt to 
provide alternative justifications of why the expected relationship is not observed 
in the studies (i.e. Prendergast, 2002). To our best knowledge, this is the first study 
which has attempted to test experimentally the trade-off between risk and 
incentives. Testing this relationship in a lab provides enhanced control which in 
turn allows obtaining more and better information on of the parameters of the 
model. While previous studies have found mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between risk and incentive intensity, my findings are in line with the 
negative relationship expected by the model. In addition, I find no relation 
between the variance in the performance measure and the effort choice of the agent 
as well as a strong positive relation between the effort choice of the agents and the 
piece rate offered by the principal, which both are in line with the model‟s 
prediction. However, as in the literature in social preferences and gift exchange 
games I found that the agents responded positively to higher fixed wages, 
suggesting reciprocal behaviour.  
While social preferences have been usefully modeled within the principal-
agent framework (Englmeier and Wambach, 2010), consideration has not been 
given to how authority per se may help induce compliance. There has been 
considerable attention in economics to conformism and social norms, by which 
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subjects tend to do what a number of others do (e.g. Asch, 1955; Jones, 1984; 
Lopez-Perez, 2008; Zafar, 2011), and there is of course a significant empirical 
literature on peer effects (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Kawaguchi, 2004; Powell et 
al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006) and on social image and pro-social behavior (e.g., 
Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 
2009; Ariely et al., 2009), but the focus of this research has been on what may  be 
labeled as horizontal social pressure, i.e. pressure by peers. 
 In the last chapter of this thesis I focus on whether the agent has a drive to 
obey as a result of social image utility towards the authority. More specifically, I 
examine whether vertical, i.e. hierarchical, social pressure induces conformism, 
even when there is no financial reason for obeying, and even when the domain for 
the action to be undertaken by the agent is anti-social. The results suggest that 
obedience is a powerful motivating mechanism. More specifically I find that when 
a constant pressure to obey is applied to engage in destruction, the destruction rate 
is over 40%. As many as, six subjects out of ten are willing to destroy when more 
pressure is provided at specific intervals in time, with no need for an explicit reason 
or for the potential for reciprocal aggression. As a result the findings of this chapter 
are important for future developments in principal-agent modeling and more 
generally in thinking about incentives and delegation in organizations as, even in 
the lack of economic incentives, individuals may tend at least to some degree to 
obey orders, and this is exploited by economic organizations big and small as a 
management tool. 
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Chapter 1: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing 
Contracts1 
 
1. Introduction 
This article explores how both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives can 
complement each other in principal-agent relationships. The importance of 
monetary incentives has been repeatedly emphasised within contract theory while 
economists as Lazear have claimed that “Incentives are the essence of economics” 
(1986, p2). Most of the work in principal-agent theory has focused on how to 
design contracts which monetarily incentivise agents to act according to their 
principals‟ expectations. In the meanwhile, a growing literature from experimental 
economics and psychology has highlighted the important role of intrinsic 
motivation on decision making in general, but also in the more specific context of 
agency problems (e.g. reciprocity and fairness concerns). This behavioural research 
has shown that the use of monetary incentives may undermine intrinsic motivation 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) or could have adverse effects in the long run 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2003). Whereas some authors argue for non-monetary means to 
overcome crucial issues embedded in principal-agent settings such as selecting 
agents by their preferences (Prendergast, 2008), other researchers pointed out that 
monetary incentives might work, however their effectiveness depends on the degree 
of the agents‟ intrinsic motivation (Boly, 2010) or the size of the monetary 
incentives (James, 2005). In this paper we integrate the above perspectives by 
showing that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation may not crowd out each other but 
instead act as complements, leading to Pareto optimal allocations (c.f. Murdock, 
2002). 
Recently, Fehr et al. (2007) showed that most principals, when offered the 
choice between an enforceable monitoring contract (MC) and a non-enforceable 
bonus contract (BC), preferred the bonus contract (roughly 90%). In addition, they 
found that the effort exerted by the agents and the average payoff for both the 
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with my supervisor Prof. Daniel Zizzo and Dr. Axel 
Sonntag. 
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principals and the agents were higher in bonus contract than in monitoring contract 
settings. These results are the opposite of what economic theory predicts under a 
narrow self-interest assumption. In particular, payoff maximizing principals should 
choose the monitoring contract as its anti-shirking punishment mechanism should 
result in higher effort and payoff levels than in a bonus contracts setting (where 
effort is expected to be zero). Fehr et al. (2007) argued that the bonus contract was 
preferred to the monitoring contract due to social preferences. However, other 
reasons might have affected the principals‟ choices as well. Regarding Fehr & 
Gächter (2002), selecting of a contract that contains the possibility of fining could 
be perceived as a hostile act itself and might send the agent a signal of distrust 
which in turn could have increased the likelihood to shirk (Bacharach et al., 2007). 
Hence, the monetary incentive of a 33% chance of detecting shirking behaviour (as 
it was the case in Fehr et al. (2007)) was probably not enough to outweigh the 
disadvantageous effects of detrimental behavioural signals. In contrast to the results 
of Fehr et al. that cannot be explained by narrow profit maximizing behaviour, 
Anderhub et al. (2002) who used a similar agency setting, found that principals, 
when using highly flexible revenue sharing contracts, “clearly recognize the agency 
problem and react accordingly” (Anderhub et al., 2002, p.24). In other words, 
principals behaved very much in line with the profit maximizing predictions. 
However, interestingly, they also “take fair sharing into account” (Anderhub et al. 
2002, p.24).  
In order to consolidate previous findings that a contract with voluntary 
bonus payments dominated a contract that offered enforceable monetary incentives 
with evidence that positive monetary incentives could achieve efficient yet fair 
outcomes, we combine Fehr et al.'s (2007) bonus contract with a less flexible 
version of Anderhub et al.'s (2002) revenue sharing contract
2
 and add a trust 
contract as a third option. In our revenue sharing contract a principal defines a non-
negative fixed wage and additionally offers the agent a share of the total (gross) 
revenue. In contrast to the MC, this contract does not involve any payoff-relevant 
probabilities and therefore does not induce additional risk. As the principals also 
lack an instrument to specify fines for shirking agents, they do not need to worry 
                                                     
2
 We do not allow negative fixed wages. 
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about sending any negative signals of distrust or hostility. Most importantly, the 
revenue sharing contract (henceforth Incentive Contract or IC) allows social 
preferences to be expressed by offering a generous share of the total revenue to the 
agent. Hence, a principal can express social preferences in both the BC and IC if 
she chooses to do so.  
Considering the above, there are good reasons to expect bonus and incentive 
contracts to appear interesting to the principals. Finding out which contract finally 
is preferred over the other is the main aim of this article. Additionally, it is also of 
interest to examine which contract on average will generate the highest total surplus 
and how that surplus will be divided between the principal and the agent. 
Furthermore, there are two additional dimensions which are distinctively different 
in our design from that of Fehr et al., (2007) and Anderhub et al., (2002). Firstly, in 
our experiment the principal can choose between three possible contracts. Those are 
the trust contract (TC), the bonus contract (BC), and the incentive contract (IC). In 
the TC the principal offers a fixed wage to the agent first, who in response exerts a 
specific effort level. The structure of the trust contract therefore can be interpreted 
as a gift exchange game (c.f. Fehr et al., 1998). Fehr et al. (2007) pointed out that 
the trust contract is just a special case of a bonus contract (as one could choose the 
BC and set the bonus to zero) and Anderhub et al. (2002) similarly argued that TC  
is also just a special case on an incentive contract (as one could only pay a fixed 
wage and set the revenue share to zero). Yet, there may be motives for a principal 
who chooses the BC or IC to actually use the bonus or the revenue share as it is an 
available option. In order to investigate the usage of such opportunity we made the 
TC an explicit option. 
  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we controlled for confound effects 
between the contract choices and determining the parameters within the chosen 
contract. When a principal has the option to choose among the three contracts the 
choice of the contract per se may act as a signal to the agent regarding the 
intentions of the principal. For example, when a principal chooses the BC among 
the three contracts and promises a large bonus with a small fixed wage for a high 
effort level, this may be interpreted by the agent as attempting to fool him (the 
agent) into exerting a high effort in order to free ride on him afterwards. This 
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interpretation is conditional to the fact that the principal could have chosen the IC 
in which it could have been ensured that the agent is paid for his effort. However, 
when the BC is exogenously given, the intentions of the principal are less clear. 
More generally, when there is a range of contracts the choice of contract may create 
a signal which consequently will affect both the parameters chosen within the 
contract and the behaviour of the agent. In order to control for this potential 
confound games with exogenously set trust, bonus, and incentive contracts have 
been added to the experimental design.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the 
theoretical predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results, and section 5 concludes. The experimental 
instructions as well as proofs for the theoretical prediction are provided in the 
appendix. 
2. The Principal Agent Problem and Contract Design 
In the chosen setting a principal hires an agent to carry out production. The 
revenue of production depends on the agent‟s effort level   such that          
 . For providing effort, the agent bears a cost of           with    
              . Neither on revenue nor on effort can be contracted upon. In our 
environment exist three types of contracts.  
Trust contract (TC) 
In a trust contract the principal offers the agent an unconditional fixed wage 
  and suggests the agent to provide an effort level   . However, if the agent accepts 
this offer, the suggested effort level    cannot be enforced by the principal. 
Consequently, the principal‟s monetary payoff resulting from a trust contract 
         is defined as       , whereas the agent earns       . 
Bonus contract (BC) 
Similarly to the trust contract, the principal offers a fixed wage   and 
suggests an effort level   . However, differently to the TC, the principal also 
announces to pay a bonus                        if the agent delivers the 
suggested effort level. After the agent‟s effort choice, the principal has the 
opportunity to pay the agent a voluntary bonus in addition to the fixed wage  . 
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Neither the agent‟s effort level   nor the principal‟s bonus payment   are 
enforceable. 
Incentive contract (IC) 
The principal jointly decides on a fixed wage   and a share    
                         that specifies how much of the totally generated revenue 
she will return to the agent. Note that in contrast to the bonus payment  , the 
amount        is compulsory part of the incentive contract, i.e. there is no 
uncertainty involved whether the principal might pay a bonus and – if at all – what 
amount, but the agent by choosing his effort level also determines his own income. 
The agent‟s payoff in our incentive contract setting is              . 
Conversely, the principal‟s payoff is             . 
The expected payoffs for principals and agents are to be understood as on 
top of their initial endowment. 
    
                                       
                                 
                            
  
    
                                       
                                 
                           
  
Under the assumption that both, principals and agents behave as selfishly 
payoff maximizers, the game theoretic solution predicts that principals should never 
choose the trust contract nor the bonus contract. In both contracts, TC and BC, 
selfish agent has no incentive to provide a higher effort level than zero. As the 
principal anticipates this incentive structure, she should never offer such a contract 
with a fixed wage greater than zero. Hence, following standard economic theory, 
neither TC nor BC should result in Pareto improvements relative to the status quo. 
The incentive contract, however, due to its obliging structure potentially provides 
sufficient monetary incentives to achieve a net welfare increase (Pareto 
improvement). The word „potentially‟ points to the fact that not all feasible 
incentive contracts are incentive compatible. In order to make an IC incentive 
compatible, the return share of the total revenue needs to exceed a certain value. 
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Therefore, selfishly payoff maximizing principals should choose the incentive 
contract, suggest an effort level of 20 and offer a revenue share of 0.27
3
.  
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
  At the beginning of the experiment all subjects were randomly selected to 
become principals or agents and were paired up to groups consisting of one 
principal and one agent each (absolute stranger fixed matching). It was common 
knowledge that this role would not change until the end of the experiment. The 
instructions were split-up into several parts and were provided to the subjects in a 
piecewise manner at the beginning of every stage. The experiment consisted of 
several different games the order of which was subject to experimentally controlled 
variation. The following paragraphs describe each of the games. Figure 1 presents a 
structural overview of the full experimental design. 
 
Figure 1: Sequential Structure of the Experiment 
Sessions 1-6 
Round 1 Round 2-7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
TBI TBI-r ex.TC ex.BC ex.IC 
 
Sessions 7-12 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5-10 
ex.TC ex.BC ex.IC TBI TBI-r 
 
Note: In the games ex.TC, ex.BC, and ex.IC the contracts could not be chosen but were set exogenously to be a 
Trust, Bonus, and Incentive Contract, respectively. TBI and TBI-r represent a one shot and repeated contract 
choice settings, respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 The derivation of these contract specifications is presented in the appendix. 
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The exogenous Trust Contract game (ex.TC) 
In the first stage of the TC game the principal chooses the size of the fixed 
wage she wants to offer and suggests an effort level to the agent. In the second 
stage the agent after being informed about the offered contract decides on an effort 
level. In the third stage both the agent and the principal get informed about their 
earnings and the round ends. 
The exogenous Bonus Contact game (ex.BC) 
In the first stage of the BC game the principal chooses the size of the fixed 
wage she wants to offer, and the size of the bonus she promises to offer if she is 
satisfied by the effort level that will be offered by the agent and also suggests an 
effort level to the agent. In the second stage the agent after being informed about 
the offered contract decides an effort level. In the third stage the principal after 
being informed about the agent‟s effort level decides if she wants to offer a bonus 
and of what size. In the fourth stage both the agent and the principal get informed 
about their earnings and the round ends. 
The exogenous Incentive Contract game (ex.IC) 
In the first stage the principal decides the values of the fixed wage, the share 
on the total revenue that will be given to the agent, and suggests an effort level. In 
the second stage the agent after being informed about the offered contract decides 
an effort level. In the third stage both the agent and the principal get informed about 
their earnings and the round finishes
 
The one shot Trust-Bonus-Incentive (TBI) and repeated Trust-Bonus-Incentive 
(TBI-r) games  
In the first stage the principal chooses between the 3 possible contracts. In 
the second stage the principal decides the values for the parameters of the chosen 
contract and suggests an effort level to the agent. In the third stage the agent after 
being informed about the offered contract decides on an effort level. In the fourth 
stage both the agent and the principal get informed about their earnings and the 
round finishes. In the repeated version of the TBI game the aforementioned process 
is repeated five times (resulting in six TBIr games in total). After the subjects read 
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the instructions they had to answer four multiple choice questions. These were 
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and explanations of the right or wrong 
answer were provided by the program. Afterwards, three practice games identical to  
the  ex.TC, ex.BC, and ex.IC  were  played  to help  the  subjects  familiarising with 
the experiment and the z-Tree environment. The participants could ask questions at 
the end of each practice round. The three trial rounds were followed by ten actual 
payoff-relevant rounds consisting of one one-shot game of ex.TC, ex.BC, ex.IC, 
and TBI, amended by 6 repeated TBI games (TBI-r). The order of the ten actual 
rounds was counterbalanced over sessions (see Figure 1) to control for order 
effects. As it has been shown above, under the assumption of profit maximizing 
behaviour, neither the trust contract nor the bonus contract would result in payoffs 
other than the initial endowments. In contrast, the incentive contact offers the 
opportunity to achieve much higher profits both for the principals and the agents. 
Therefore, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 1: Principals prefer the incentive contract over the bonus or trust 
contract. 
Hypothesis 2: Agents provide more effort in incentive contract than in bonus 
contract or trust contract settings. 
Assuming profit maximizing behaviour of both principals and agents should result 
in a 60:40 split of the profits in favour of the principals; a distribution clearly 
different from an equal split. However, as it is well known from experimental 
literature that individuals do actually show consider fairness as well, we might be 
finding a more equal distribution than the profit maximizing prediction.  
Hypothesis 3: The overall profits are distributed in a ratio of 60:40 between 
principals and agents to the disadvantage of the latter. 
Profit maximizing principals should, whenever allowed to do so, choose the 
incentive contract and offer an incentive compatible share of the generated revenue. 
However, they should not offer more than the lowest share that incentivises the 
desired effort level sufficiently. Therefore, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 4: Principals offer the lowest feasible incentive compatible share of 
0.27.  
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The incentive contract is the only contract that theoretically allows a Pareto 
improvement compared to the initial endowments. Thus, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 5: Principals‟ and agents‟ combined surplus is higher in incentive 
contract than in bonus or trust contract settings. 
4. Results and Discussion 
The actual experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Centre for 
Behavioral and Experimental Social Sciences of the University of East Anglia. In 
total 144 subjects participated in the experiment. On average participants received 
£15.46 for an effort of approximately 90 minutes. All subsequently presented non-
parametric test statistics were calculated on session level means per game (ex.TC, 
ex.BC, ex.IC, TBI, or TBI-r)
4
, unless stated otherwise. As some experimental 
observations are not independent from each other (which is required by the applied 
statistical tests), this procedure is necessary to attain unbiased test statistics. 
Result 1: In line with hypothesis 1, when given the option to choose between three 
contracts, both in the one shot (TBI) and the repeated games (TBI-r) a great 
majority of subjects chose the incentive contract IC. 
Evidence: Whereas on average 75% decided to choose the Incentive 
contract, the Bonus contract and the Trust contract were chosen much less 
frequently, accounting for 21% and 4% of total choices, respectively
5
. 
Although the relative share of Trust, Bonus and Incentive contracts seems to 
be quite different, interestingly, the distribution among contract choice between one 
shot (TBI) and repeated (TBI-r) contract choices is not different at all (see Figure 
2). Computing Wilcoxon ranksum tests for differences between TBI and TBI-r for 
each of the three contracts resulted in non-significant results with p > 0.9 for all 
                                                     
4
 As there is only one observation for every ex.TC, ex.BC, ex.IC, and TBI round, the means equal 
the individual observations. Only the data from TBI-r (as repeated six times) is affected by this 
procedure. 
5
 These numbers do not vary between TBI and TBI-r. Corresponding non-parametric statistics that 
test for potential differences between TBI and TBI-r are provided subsequently. 
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three comparisons
6
. This result is surprising as one might have expected a higher 
share of bonus contracts in the repeated game (TBI-r), as reputation effects might 
come into play (c.f. Falk et al. 1999).  
 
Figure 2: Percentages of chosen contracts in one shot (TBI) and repeated choice (TBI-r) 
settings 
 
However, if building trust between principals and agents might have played 
a role (fixed matching in TBI-r for six rounds), it did not seem to affect the 
principals‟ contract choice behaviour. Investigating data from the one shot contract 
choice (TBI) for differences regarding relative contract choice propensities results 
in highly significant results between all possible combinations (TC<->BC: p=0.003, 
TC<->IC: p<0.001, BC<->IC: p<0.001). Thus, IC was significantly more often 
chosen than BC which itself had a significantly higher propensity to be chosen than 
TC. Computing Wilcoxon ranksum tests for the TBI-r data reveals similar results. 
In fact, IC was statistically significantly chosen more often than BC (p<0.001) and 
TC (p<0.001), whereas the frequency of BCs was significantly higher than the 
frequency of TCs (p<0.001).  
                                                     
6
 Note that individual observations were used to compute these Wilcoxon ranksum test statistics as 
using the averages of TBI-r observations would lead to wrong conclusions. This is because 
averaging affects rank comparisons considerably, and thus would results in a not directly 
comparable vector of contract choices. 
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Figure 3 focuses on repeated choices and illustrates the distribution of the 
contracts across time for the repeated choice setting (TBI-r). The graph indicates 
that on average the IC is chosen more often in the later rounds. Starting at 71% on 
the first game and gradually increasing to 86% on the sixth and last game. In order 
to test whether there exists a significant time trend, a simple probit model was 
estimated with IC choices as dependent and the experimental TBI-r period as 
independent variable. This estimation results in a statistically significant positive 
time effect (p=0.03). Analyzing the corresponding marginal effects indicates that 
the probability of choosing IC increases by 2.7% in each period. There was no 
significant time trend for choosing BC (probit regression, negative coefficient but 
p=0.16) nor for the share of trust contracts (probit regression, p=0.06). Principals 
seem to realize over time that choosing the incentive contract could increase their 
payoff considerably (see result two). Interestingly, although using ten repetition 
periods, which should increase learning effects, Fehr et al. (2007) did not find a 
significant time trend for the bonus contract that was dominantly chosen in their 
experiment. In summary, as the incentive contract was preferred over the bonus and 
the trust contract in all contract choice settings, result 1 clearly corroborates 
hypothesis 1. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of chosen contracts over time in repeated contract choice settings (TBI-r) 
 
Result 2: In line with hypothesis 2, the incentive contract was the most efficient 
contract in terms of agents‟ effort and total revenue. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6
Period
Trust Contract
Bonus Contract
Incentive Contract
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Evidence: As the principals‟ profit strictly monotonically increases with the 
effort applied by the agents, suggesting the maximum possible amount (20) would 
be the only meaningful decision.  
 
Figure 4: Suggested effort by contract type over time in repeated contract choice settings 
(TBI-r) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that most principals understood what would be most 
beneficial to them, resulting in very high levels of demanded effort. There is also 
very little variation between contract types, which is in line with the theoretical 
prediction. 
 
Figure 5: Revealed effort by contract type over time in repeated contract choice settings (TBI-
r) 
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Analyzing agents‟ actual effort response, however, gives a quite different 
picture (see figure 5). There seem to be huge differences between the three possible 
contracts. Due to the linear relation between the agent‟s effort and the resulting 
total revenue
7
, a more detailed statistical analysis of revealed effort is deliberately 
omitted here in favour of more descriptive details and non-parametric tests on total 
revenue, subsequently. On average, the incentive contract IC generated 
approximately 68% more total revenue than the bonus contract in the one shot 
settings (TBI) and 45% more total revenue than BC in the repeated choice (TBI-r) 
situations. The trust contract TC, as expected, is by far the worst alternative with 
respect to efficiency. Table 1 reports the average total revenue generated within 
each chosen contract type in the TBI and TBI-r, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Average total revenue by contract type in one shot (TBI) and a repeated choice (TBI-
r) settings 
 
Trust 
Contract 
Bonus 
Contract 
Incentive 
Contract 
TBI 200 1420 2389 
TBI-r 813 1690 2476 
 
Comparing the average total revenues of the BC and the IC contracts in the 
TBI and TBI-r rounds reveals that the incentive contract in the one shot (TBI) as 
well as in the repeated (TBI-r) game, results in higher total revenues (see Table 1). 
A Wilcoxon ranksum test on these differences between IC and BC revealed 
statistically significant results both for the TBI (p=0.003) and TBI-r rounds 
(p<0.001), describing IC as the more efficient contract. In addition, to test whether 
the average total revenues of BC and IC are statistically different between the TBI 
and TBI-r rounds, Wilcoxon ranksum tests were calculated on that as well. Whereas 
the test statistic for the IC comparison was significant with p=0.006, there could not 
be found significantly higher revenue for BC in the TBI-r as compared to TBI 
                                                     
7
 Revenue = 150 * Revealed Effort 
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(p=0.421). However, this only might be due to too few observations for BC in the 
TBI games. Considering the above evidence, hypothesis 2 is corroborated. 
Result 3: In contrast to hypothesis 3, both in the one shot (TBI) and the repeated 
(TBI-r) contract choice settings, when the incentive contract was chosen, the 
distribution of the total surplus was fairer than the profit maximising prediction. 
This result is driven by the principals‟ choice of providing higher than efficient 
revenue shares. 
Evidence: In the previous sections it has been shown that the incentive 
contract was chosen most often compared to the other alternatives BC and TC. 
Additionally, IC generated significantly higher revenues than the other contract 
options. However, the actual distribution of profits has not been discussed yet. 
Before reporting and analyzing empirical evidence on actual profit distributions and 
the implied degree of fairness, it is worth considering the profit distributions 
predicted by economic theory. Profit maximizing theory for trust contracts as well 
as for bonus contracts predicts zero effort by the agents, resulting in zero revenue 
and consequently no additional gains compared to the status quo (endowments). In 
contrast, the incentive contract encourages selfish agents to show effort and is 
expected to produce a net surplus compared to the status quo. In particular, if both, 
the principal as well as the agent would behave as if they were profit maximizers, 
the principal would receive 5.190ECU and the agent‟s payoff would be 3.390ECU 
(see details about the payoff-structure in the appendix).  
The top part of Table 2 shows that the principal would receive 60% of the 
total surplus, leaving only 40% for the agent, a clearly unequal split. However, 
additionally Table 2 also displays the actually observed profit distributions in a one 
shot (TBI) and repeated (TBI-r) choice situations. The results suggest that on 
average the distribution of the total surplus, when the incentive contract was 
chosen, was fairer than what economic theory would predict in both TBI and TBI-r. 
In particular, the principals on average kept 53% of the total surplus in the TBI 
rounds, and 54% in the TBI-r, respectively. Whereas the distribution of profits in 
both TBI and TBI-r were significantly different from the theoretical prediction 
(Wilcoxon test, both p<0.001), there was no significant difference between TBI and 
TBI-r (Wilcoxon test, p=0.150). This result rejects hypothesis 3 (that the split 
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would be 60:40) and is, again, rather surprising as it might be expected that in a 
finite repeated game reputation effects could promote social preferences (Falk et al. 
1999) which might be reflected in more equal distributions of profits. Comparing 
our profit distribution with other empirical findings of the similarly structured 
settings indicates that a division of 53:47 split could be considered as a fair split 
(Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Güth et al. 1982). Such a share might even be regarded as 
surprisingly equal, taking into account that principals might rightly claim more than 
half, as it was them who, by their contract choice, made any gains in total revenue 
possible in the first place (Güth et al. 1982).  
 
Table 2: Distribution of profits resulting from incentive contracts for the profit maximizing 
prediction, one shot (TBI), and repeated choice (TBI-r) settings 
  
Average 
Profit Relative Share 
Theoretical 
Prediction 
Principal 5190 60% 
Agent 3390 40% 
Difference 
 
21% 
Results TBI 
Principal 4269 53% 
Agent 3806 47% 
Difference 
 
6% 
Results TBI-r 
Principal 4359 54% 
Agent 3786 46% 
Difference 
 
7% 
 
Result 4: In line with hypothesis 4, the great majority of offered incentive contracts 
were specified incentive compatible. However, additionally, principals offered 
significantly higher revenue shares than would be efficient. 
Evidence:  
 
Table 3 provides information on the incentive compatibility of incentive 
contracts observed across all sessions. In the exogenous IC round8, i.e. principals 
                                                     
8
 For more details see the experimental design in section 3. 
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only had to specify the parameters of the incentive contract, but could not choose 
between TC, BC, and IC, out of the 72 observed incentive contracts 53 (74%) 
where incentive compatible and 19 (26%) were not.  
 
Table 3: Share of incentive compatible and incentive incompatible incentive contracts by 
experimental game types 
 Number of 
Observations 
incentive 
compatible 
incentive 
incompatible 
incentive 
compatible 
% 
incentive 
incompatible 
% 
Exogenous IC 72 53 19 74% 26% 
TBI 54 45 9 83% 17% 
TBI-r 323 253 70 78% 22% 
Note that Exogenous IC denotes a one shot incentive contract game with an exogenously determined 
contract type (IC). TBI and TBI-r represent contract choice situations in a one shot and repeated 
game, respectively. 
 
In the one shot contract choice setting (TBI) 54 incentive contracts were 
observed of which 45 (83%) where incentive compatible and 9 (17%) were not. 
Similarly, in the repeated contract choice setting (TBI-r) 253 out of 323 (78%) 
incentive contracts where incentive compatible. Note that an IC was deemed 
incentive compatible if the offered share was equal or higher to 0.27. The 
throughout relatively high proportion of incentive compatible contract offers 
indicate that principals in general had a good understanding of what contract 
specifications they were providing. Moreover, interestingly, the principals on 
average offered a considerably higher share of their revenues than it would make 
sense if both, principals and agents were selfish profit maximizers.  
Figure 6 indicates that the majority of revenue shares offered were higher 
than the efficient level of 0.27. In fact, the mean offered share was 0.382 (median 
0.4), and was not significantly different between ex.IC, TBI, and TBI-r games. The 
actually offered shares were statistically significantly higher than the lowest 
incentive compatible share 0.27 (Sign test, p<0.001), which clearly rejects 
hypothesis 4. 
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Figure 6: Histogram of revenue shares offered by the principals of all accepted incentive 
contract games 
 
Note that all accepted incentive contract games includes exogenously set ICs (ex.IC), one shot (TBI) and 
repeated contract choice situations. 
Considering that in an IC setting the principals could influence the 
distribution of final profits by setting fixed wage and revenue share, the actually 
observed share offers might mean that principals actually do care about fair 
outcomes. Raising the revenue share over the efficient incentive compatible level 
0.27 cannot be explained by selfish profit maximization. Hence, result 3 in general 
suggests that under an incentive contract principals may actually show concerns for 
fairness. Such an interpretation would be in line with the results of Anderhub, et al. 
(2002). 
Result 5: In line with hypothesis 5, using incentive contracts on average led to a 
significantly higher total surplus than using bonus or trust contracts. However, such 
welfare gains were mostly absorbed by the principals. 
Evidence: Table 4 reports the average profits of TC, BC and IC as observed 
in one shot setting (TBI). Examining the absolute surplus of agents is not 
significantly different between BC and IC (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.343). The 
same is true for the difference between agent‟s surplus resulting from TC and BC 
(p=0.953), as well as, TC and IC (p=0.111). However, the principals‟ profits seem 
to vary quite considerably between different contract situations. The incentive 
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contract led to significantly higher profits for the principals than the trust contract 
(p=0.004) or the bonus contract (p=0.030). Interestingly, the difference between TC 
and BC was not statistically significant (p=0.172). In general, the results displayed 
in Table 4 indicate that principals absorb a considerable share of the welfare gains 
obtained by choosing a more efficient contract type. 
 
Table 4: Average and standard deviation of profits in one shot contract choice settings (TBI) 
 
Trust Contract Bonus Contract Incentive Contract 
 
Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD 
Principal  2700 (44%) 173 3582 (48%) 1205 4269 (53%) 577 
Agent 3496 (56%) 3 3663 (52%) 542 3806 (47%) 410 
total 6196 (100%) 170 7245 (100%) 1190 8075 (100%) 730 
 
Similar results are also maintained in the repeated choice setting (TBI-r) as 
displayed in Table 5. There is a fairly small deviation of the distribution of the total 
surplus between BC and IC, and a larger difference in the TC. In addition, as before 
the principals who used the IC received the largest share of the total surplus, 
compared to BC and TC. However, noteworthy, the increase of the principals‟ 
relative profit share did not have detrimental effects on the agents‟ payoffs. 
Investigating the absolute surplus of agents is not significantly different between 
BC and IC (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.425). The same is true for the difference 
between agent‟s surplus resulting from TC and BC (p=0.609), as well as, TC and 
IC (p=0.723). There is also no significant difference of agents‟ profits between TBI 
and TBI-r no matter which contract was chosen. Wilcoxon ranksum tests between 
TBI and TBI-r result in p-values for the TC, BC, and IC comparisons of 0.249, 
0.518, and 0.157, respectively. 
Table 5: Average and standard deviation in repeated contract choice settings (TBI-r) 
 
Trust Contract Bonus Contract Incentive Contract 
 
Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD 
Principal  2875 (42%) 1076 3733 (49%) 988 4359 (53%) 651 
Agent 3849 (58%) 668 3755 (51%) 660 3786 (47%) 428 
total 6725 (100%) 995 7489 (100%) 1136 8145 (100%) 768 
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Figure 7: Average principals’ profits by contract type over time in repeated contract choice 
settings (TBI-r) 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the profit of agents did not change no matter 
if the game was repeated or not (TBI-r vs. TBI) and no matter which contract was 
chosen. Differently to the agents‟ profits, principals‟ profits varied with respect to 
contract choice. In the repeated choice setting (TBI-r) both, BC and IC significantly 
increased principals‟ profit compared to TC (Wilcoxon ranksum test, both 
p<0.001).  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the average profits in TBI-r of principals and 
agents, respectively. Whereas the there is a clearly visible spread between the 
principals‟ average profits, agents‟ profits do not seem to vary much with respect to 
different contracts. Moreover, IC significantly outperformed BC (p<0.001) with 
respect to principals‟ average profits. Similarly to the one shot choice (TBI), also in 
the repeated settings (TBI-r), any efficiency gains seem to be consumed by the 
principals only. Agents do not seem to profit from a growing cake, however, they 
also do not receive less. Consolidating the above evidence, the combined profit of 
principals and agents was significantly higher in incentive contract than in bonus 
and trust contract settings, which is in line with hypothesis 5.  
Result 6. The bonus contract is a riskier alternative than the incentive contract as 
measured by variance in resulting profits. 
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Evidence: Considering Table 4 and Table 5 reveals that the standard 
deviation of the average of total profits both for principals and agents is much 
larger for the bonus contracts (BC) than for the incentive contracts (IC). It has been 
argued earlier that one of the reasons why IC could dominate BC is that it is 
perceived as a contract involving less risk as compared to BC.  
Recall that in the incentive contract the share of profits is part of the contract 
which allows both the principal and the agent to know what exactly their earnings 
will be for each level of effort before the agent actually decides on his/her effort. In 
contrast, in the bonus contract setting the principal does not realise what her profits 
are going to be until the agent has decided an effort level, while the agent realises 
his profits only after the principal decides what bonus she wants to pay, after she 
has observed the actual effort level. Because of these inherit elements of the 
contract designs one would expect the variance of principals‟ profits to be larger in 
bonus contract situations. Consequently, risk averse principals could be deterred 
from choosing the bonus contract.  
Figure 8: Average agents’ profits by contract type over time in repeated contract choice 
settings (TBI-r) 
 
In order to test whether the variance of the principal profits in the BC is 
larger than in the IC, three tests have been used. A Levene‟s test (1960) and two 
alternative formulations of Levene‟s test which where suggested by Brown & 
Forsythe (1974). Levene‟s test relaxes the assumption that the data are drawn from 
an underlying normal distribution (which would be required for an F test). The two  
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Table 6: Determinants of Agents’ Effort 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Revealed Effort Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Hierarchical 
Linear Model 
grouped by 
subjects and 
sessions 
Hierarchical 
Linear Model 
grouped by 
subjects and 
sessions 
Constant -5.006 
(2.937) 
-5.761 
(6.999) 
-5.004 
(2.936) 
-5.760 
(6.999) 
Demanded Effort 0.460*** 
(0.122) 
0.508 
(0.423) 
0.460*** 
(0.122) 
0.508 
(0.423) 
Fixed wage 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
BC 1.373 
(2.703) 
3.509 
(7.577) 
1.372 
(2.703) 
3.511 
(7.577) 
BC x Demanded Effort  -0.136 
(0.451) 
 -0.136 
(0.451) 
BC x fixed wage 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
BC x announced bonus 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
IC 7.837** 
(2.461) 
5.732 
(8.125) 
7.837** 
(2.461) 
5.730 
(8.125) 
IC x Demanded Effort  0.107 
(0.475) 
 0.107 
(0.475) 
IC x fixed wage -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
IC x share 9.407** 
(3.290) 
9.307** 
(3.297) 
9.409** 
(3.291) 
9.309** 
(3.298) 
IC x Incentive compatible offer 2.823** 
(1.059) 
2.649* 
(1.079) 
2.823** 
(1.059) 
2.648* 
(1.080) 
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS and hierarchical linear regressions for 
repeated choice settings (TBI-r) only, clustered by subjects. Number of Observations: 399. BC and IC are 
dummies for the bonus and the incentive contract, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
0.1%, 1% and 5% level. 
 
Brown and Forsythe variations of Levene‟s test in the first case the median instead 
of the mean and in the second case a trimmed mean is used. In all three tests the 
null hypothesis of equality of variances is rejected with p < 0.01. Consequently, the 
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variance in principals‟ profits is significantly higher for BC than for IC. Hence, risk 
aversion could be an additional factor affecting contract choice and thus, 
complementary to profit maximization, explain why IC was chosen more often than 
BC. 
 
Revealed Effort 
Analyzing the results of Table 6 reveals that the size of the fixed wage offer 
did not affect the decision effort. As neither the coefficient for fixed wage nor one 
of the interactions of fixed wage with the contract type dummies are significant, 
this is true for all contract types. This is interesting as many real world contracts 
still offer fixed wages without any effort dependent compensation part. According 
to our data, solely raising the fixed wage did not result in more engagement of the 
agents. However, both variable income parts, i.e. the announced bonus for bonus 
contracts and the share for incentive contracts show a highly significant positive 
coefficient. Our interpretation of this result is that if agents were offered a bonus or 
incentive contract, the size of the announced bonus or share becomes more salient 
than the fixed wage of such a contract and agents reveal more effort the more they 
overall profit from such a costly decision. Particularly the latter interpretation is 
fostered by the positive and highly significant coefficient of the interaction term IC 
x Incentive compatible offer. This means that incentive contracts that offered a 
share greater or equal to 0.27 (the incentive compatibility threshold), agents were 
willing to significantly increase their effort by at least 2.6 on average. 
Whereas there is no significant difference between the effort levels revealed 
in TC and BC, the average effort provided in incentive contracts significantly 
increased by almost eight (columns 1 and 3 of Table 6), which is impressive 
considering the possible range for e [0,20]. This would mean that agents are willing 
to provide much more effort if offered an incentive contract, than in a trust contract 
or bonus contract setting. Focussing on specification 1 and 3 reveals that cheap talk 
variables, which, from a strict economic point of view, should not have any effect 
on the revealed effort level, had a significant influence. That is true for both, the 
announced bonus (i.e. a non-binding declaration of a prospective voluntary bonus 
payment by the  principal) and the  demanded  effort  (i.e. a non-binding suggestion 
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for the effort level). Whereas compliance to the suggested effort level would have 
made sense under bonus contracts, in order to persuade the principal to grant a large 
bonus payment, it does not make sense to send a signal to the principal in an IC 
setting, as the agent‟s effort choice finally determines both players‟ outcome. 
However, scrutinizing the effect of demanded effort in more detail by adding 
interaction terms for demanded effort with BC and IC, respectively, changes parts 
of the results considerably (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 6). The coefficient for 
demanded effort becomes insignificant, but moreover, none of the interaction terms 
with demanded effort is significant either, which suits to the above cheap-talk 
interpretation with respect to demanded effort. Furthermore, controlling for 
experimental order effects (see Figure 1) did not change the regression results 
significantly. Therefore, the corresponding control dummy was removed from the 
specifications reported in Table 6.  
 
Bonus payments 
The only contract that required an additional decision after the agents‟ effort 
levels have been chosen is BC. The principals had to specify which amount [0, 
3000] they would like to pay to their agents. A regression analysis that accounted 
for non-independent observations at subject and session level revealed that the 
principals indeed took the level of effort into account when choosing the bonus 
size. Increasing the actual effort level by one unit would ceteris paribus result in a 
bonus payment raise of almost 36 experimental currency units (ECUs). 
Furthermore, in specification 1 the coefficient of fixed wage is negative and 
statistically significant at a 5% level. This result could be interpreted as a trade-off 
between a high fixed wage and a generous bonus payment such that an increase of 
the fixed wage by one ECU would reduce the expected bonus payment by 0.3 
ECUs. However, the significance vanishes if the non-independence of the data is 
appropriately taken into account by using a hierarchical linear model (specification 
2). The revealed effort level remains as the only significant explanatory variable 
indicating a 34 ECU bonus increase for one unit of effort increase. 
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Table 7: Actual Bonus Payments 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) 
Actual Bonus Payment Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Hierarchical Linear 
Model grouped by 
subjects and sessions 
Constant 144.561 
(158.042) 
154.139 
(196.942) 
Revealed effort 35.951*** 
(9.954) 
34.254** 
(13.184) 
Effort demand exceeded -187.380 
(149.003) 
-185.416 
(401.613) 
Fixed wage -0.241* 
(0.117) 
-0.220 
(0.145) 
Announced bonus -0.002  
(0.152) 
-0.007 
(0.126) 
Revealed effort x Effort demand exceeded 12.824 
(14.114) 
13.531 
(24.274) 
5. This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of an OLS and a hierarchical 
linear specification for accepted bonus contracts in repeated contract choice settings (TBI-r) only. Number 
of Observations: 80. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This article explored how monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation can 
complement each other in principal-agent settings. In order to consolidate previous 
findings that contracts with voluntary bonus payments were preferred over 
enforceable monetary incentives contracts with evidence that positive monetary 
incentives could achieve efficient yet fair outcomes, we combined Fehr et al.'s 
(2007) bonus contract with an adapted version of Anderhub et al.'s (2002) revenue 
sharing contract and added a trust contract as a third option.  
In contrast to Fehr et al. (2007) who found that only 10% of the principals 
chose the enforceable monetary incentivized contract, in our experiment up to 86% 
of the principals chose such an option. What has been surprising is that in the 
repeated game (TBI-r) the proportion of incentive contracts was sustained at the 
same high level as in the one shot game (TBI). One might have expected a higher 
share of the bonus contract in the repeated game, as reputation effects might have 
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come into play. However, if building trust between principals and agents might 
have played a role (fixed matching in TBI-r for six rounds), it did not seem to have 
affected the principals‟ contract choice behaviour. Furthermore, the incentive 
contract was the most efficient contract in terms of agents‟ effort and total revenue 
and both, in the one shot (TBI) and the repeated (TBI-r) contract choice settings, 
when the incentive contract was chosen, the distribution of the total surplus was 
fairer than the profit maximising prediction. The latter result was driven by the 
principals‟ choice of providing significantly higher than efficient revenue shares. 
Thus, share offers were not only incentive compatible, but principals, although 
being responsive to the monetary incentives, did not only care about efficiency and 
their personal profit but also showed concerns for fairness. In addition, our 
experimental results indicate that another explanation of why principals preferred 
the IC could be attained from the difference in the variance of profits between the 
IC and the BC. Assuming the principals were risk averse
9
, a smaller variance in 
profits would have implied a higher expected utility and in turn would have 
favoured the use of IC over the BC.  
Overall, this experiment shows that concerns for fairness and reciprocity 
can go in hand with the use of monetary incentives as long as the correct monetary 
incentive mechanism is used. Yet, we are still in an early stage of understanding the 
interaction of monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation and there is still a lot of 
fascinating and important research to be done. For instance, future research could 
investigate if the results observed here can be replicated in a multitasking 
environment or how positively incentivized contracts would be affected by the 
introduction of risk.  
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Appendix A 
Parameters of the Experimental Implementation 
Three different contracts types are used in this experiment, the trust contract (TC), 
the bonus contract (BC) and the incentive contract (IC).  
The agent‟s profit in the case of an incentive contract is defined as: 
   
                   (1) 
The agent‟s profit in the case of a trust contract is defined as: 
   
             (2)
 
The agent‟s profit in the case of a bonus contract is defined as: 
   
               (3) 
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The Total Revenue is given by: 
                   (4) 
The cost of effort is a strictly increasing and convex function in effort: 
                  (5) 
With: 
         
  ... Agent‟s profit in the case of TC, BC and IC, respectively 
  ... Unconditional fixed wage 
                      
     ... Revenue 
  ... Relative share of the Revenue that is transferred to the agent in the incentive 
contract 
                            
  ... Optional bonus paid to the agent in a bonus contract 
                      
  ... Effort level revealed by the agent 
                  
 
The game theoretic solution 
Given the above parameters the participation constraint, i.e. the constraint that has 
to be met in order to make any contract offer monetarily beneficial is: 
                    (6) 
or stated differently 
          
Where,      is the transfer the principal needs to provide to the agent as 
compensation for exerting effort. The nature of that transfer depends on the type of 
contract that will be chosen from the principal. Thus agents should only accept a 
contract if (6) is met. 
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The Principal‟s profit is defined as 
                     (7) 
Where      is the total revenue generated and      is the transfer to the agent. 
Thus the principal wants to: 
                
Given that the agent would accept any contract that satisfies (6) the minimum 
amount that has to be transferred to the agent has to be equal to     . Thus if 
          
The principal‟s maximization problem becomes 
                        (8) 
Inserting the actual parameters used in the experiment results in 
                  
Maximizing by   results in 
       
Thus the optimal effort level would be 74.5. As the experimental parameters only 
allow  
                 , the maximisation problem in (7) has a corner solution10 of 
      .  
Having identified the participation constraint and the profit maximising effort level, 
the following step is to show why, given the assumption that both the principal and 
the agent are rational and narrowly self-interested, the only contract that can satisfy 
the incentive compatibility constraint is the IC.  
Any contract is deemed to only be incentive compatible if: 
                                                     
10
 The decision the maximisation problem to have a corner solution has been made deliberately 
under the suspicion that will be easier for subjects in the role of principals to identify e* if that is a 
corner than an interior point. In other words, the choice for a corner solution was made to reduce 
complexity to an already highly complex design from the perspective of the principal. This choice 
though bears the cost that will be harder to test if the principals had correctly identified that e* is the 
optimum effort level or if they chose it ad hoc simply following a rule of thumb such as the more the 
better. Nevertheless, the use of corner solutions has been a standard approach to experiments which 
investigated contract design and social preferences. 
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                                (9) 
Inequality (9) implies that the agent‟s profit from exerting effort level    (which is 
maximizing the principal‟s profit) should be greater or equal to the profit that 
results from exerting all possible effort levels  .  
The following three sections examine incentive compatibility for the incentive, trust 
and bonus contracts respectively, by substituting      by the specific transfer 
definitions of each of the three contracts. 
 
The incentive contract: 
Replacing      with the incentive contract specific transfer of         
     results in: 
                                      (10) 
Given that the agent would exert an effort greater than zero if            is 
satisfied, the agent would, as a worst case accept,           . Consequently, in 
order to calculate the minimum share of the total revenue that has to be provided to 
the agent in order to make the incentive contract incentive compatible, the profit 
maximization problem for the agent could be written as 
   
                         (11) 
Maximizing (11) with respect to    leads to  
                and 
   
     
   
 
Inserting the above calculated effort level       and solving for S, finally 
provides the minimum share  . Thus, 
                  (12) 
Thus, the incentive contract is incentive compatible for any value of         . 
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With S=S* the consequent profits for the principal and the agent are respectively: 
        ECU11 and         ECU. 
 
The trust contract: 
Replacing      with the trust contract specific transfer of       results in the 
incentive compatibility constraint for all trust contracts: 
                          (13) 
Which can be restated as: 
                    (14) 
Because of (5) the only value of    that satisfies equation (14) is       Therefore, 
there exists no feasible incentive compatible trust contract for       
 
The bonus contract: 
Replacing      with the bonus contract specific transfer of         results in 
the incentive compatibility constraint for all bonus contracts: 
                             (15) 
Rewriting leads to: 
                    (16) 
This is identical to the result obtained for the trust contract. Therefore, it has been 
shown that economic theory predicts that under the assumption of selfish rational 
profit maximizing individuals no agreement can be reached between a principal and 
an agent in neither the trust nor the bonus contracts. From the results obtained 
above, it is clear that the only contract that can satisfy both the incentive 
compatibility and the participation constraints is the incentive contract IC. 
Consequently, the game theoretic solution that is expected in the TBI and TBI-r 
game(s) is that IC should dominate both BC and TC. 
 
 
                                                     
11
 ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units 
35 
 
Appendix B - Instructions 
General Instructions 
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully. 
Reading these instructions carefully could earn you a significant amount of money. 
If you face any difficulties understanding any part of the instructions please raise 
your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you. All the money that you will 
earn during this experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of this 
experiment.  
No talking is allowed through the experiment. Please switch off your mobile 
phones. 
 
Experiment Overview 
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the 
employee. There is a note on your desk clarifying your role. Communication 
between the two will be via the computer. The experiment is anonymous; this 
means that you will not know with of the other participants you are interacting. 
Interaction will be through contracts. A contract is an offer by the employer to the 
employee for offering a value of effort. The details are discussed below. 
 
The experiment consists of 3 practice stages, and 5 real stages. In the 3 practice 
stages every employer is matched with the same employee. In the real stages, the 
employer will be matched with a different employee in every stage who will also 
be different from the one he/she encountered in the practice stages. The practice 
stages are to help you familiarise with the procedure of the experiment and your 
choices will not affect your earnings. The following five „real‟ stages form the main 
body of the experiment and your choices will affect your final earnings. The 5 real 
stages consist in total of 14 rounds. At the end of the experiment the earnings you 
made from one of these rounds are randomly chosen by the computer and are added 
to your show up fee. 
 
For attending this experiment you will be given a show up fee of £3. In the 
experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of 
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the experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be exchanged 
at the exchange rate of: 250ECU = £1.  
 For example, 500ECU=£2, 1000ECU=£4, 25ECU= £0.10, 3000= £12. 
 
At the start of each stage a new set of instructions is given to you which, will 
explain the process of the stages that is starting and accompany the instructions for 
the following stages. 
 
Stage 1: Contract 1 (practice) 
In this round the employer has to decide the size of a fixed wage that he/she wants 
to pay the employee, and set a suggested effort level. The fixed wage can range 
between 0 and 3000 and the suggested effort from 0 to 20. Both the fixed wage and 
suggested effort are received by the employee before he/she decides an effort level. 
The employee has to choose an effort level which, for every unit of effort the 
employee spends, you earn 150ECU; we call this total revenue. The total 
revenue=150 x effort (see Table 8 below).  
 
At the start of every round both employer and employee are given a capital of 
3000ECU this money is for you to use within the experiment and are added to your 
earnings for the round.  
 
There are three key elements you need to note: 
Firstly, for every unit of effort the employee spends, it has a subsequent ECU cost 
to him. The exact cost of ECU for every unit of effort along with other important 
information is shown in Table 8 which is handed in a separate sheet. 
Secondly, the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee 
is not bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within 
the given range of 0 to 20.  
Thirdly, the fixed wage is paid upfront (i.e. before the employee decides an effort 
level). 
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How earnings are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the capital plus the total revenue generated by 
the employee‟s effort minus the fixed wage he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer‟s Profit= Employer capital + Total revenue – fixed wage 
In the case of the employee, his/her profits are his/her capital plus the fixed wage 
minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee‟s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage – cost of effort 
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that 
you understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
 
1. The employer chooses the fixed wage and suggest an effort level to the 
employee.  
 
2. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she 
has to decide either to accept or reject the contract. 
 
3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes. If he accepts the 
contract, he receives the offered fixed wage and decides an effort level.  
 
4. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates and 
informs both participants of their profits.  
 
Some Examples 
Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 500ECU, sets 
suggested effort to 20 and the employee decides to accept the offer and offer an 
effort level of 20. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of 
effort is 3000 ECU. So the profits for the employer are 3000ECU (the total 
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revenue) plus the employer capital of 3000ECU minus 500ECU (the fixed wage), 
therefore 5500 ECU. For the employee the profits are his/her capital of 450ECU 
plus 500ECU (the fixed wage) minus the cost for his effort which is 420ECU (see 
Table 8), therefore 3530 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume like before that the employer offers a fixed wage of 500ECU 
and sets a suggested effort of 20 and the employee decides to accept the offer and 
offer an effort level of 0. What would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: In this case the total revenue is 0ECU. The employer receives only his 
capital of 3000 which from 500ECU are subtracted (the fixed wage he/she paid) 
hence he/she earns 2500 ECU. The employee earns 500ECU (the fixed wage) plus 
his/her capital of 3000ECU therefore he/she earns 3500 ECU.  
 
Stage 2: Contract Type 2 (practice) 
Round 2 is identical to round 1 with the only exception that now the employer can 
also announce a bonus to the employee. When the employer offers the contract, 
except of the fixed wage, he/she can also announce a bonus. However, the bonus 
announcement is non-binding. That is, after the earnings for both of you are 
realised, the employer is free to decide if he/she wants to pay a bonus or not and if 
so of what size. 
Summing up, the employer has to pay a fixed wage upfront, announce a non-
binding bonus and suggest an effort level. After the employee decides an effort 
level, the employer has to decide the size of the bonus he/she wants to pay. Both 
fixed wage and bonus can range from 0ECU to 3000ECU but also the sum of the 
two (fixed wage and bonus) cannot exceed 3000ECU.  
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that 
you understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
 
1. The employer chooses the size of the fixed wage, the size of the announced 
bonus and suggests an effort level to the employee.  
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2. After being informed of the offered contract the employee has to decide 
either to accept or reject the contract. 
 
3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes. If he/she accepts the 
contract, receives the offered fixed wage and decides an effort level.  
 
4. After the employee had decided an effort level, the computer calculates and 
informs both employer and employee their profits. At this point the 
employer will be asked if he/she wants to pay a bonus and if so, of what 
size. Depending on the employer‟s choice the computer recalculates and 
informs both of you for your final profits for this stage. 
 
How earnings are calculated 
For the employer, his/her earnings are the capital plus the total revenue generated 
by the employee‟s effort minus the fixed wage and minus any bonus he/she paid. In 
other words: 
Employer‟s Profit = Employer capital + total revenue – fixed wage – bonus 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are the employee capital plus the fixed 
wage plus any bonus minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee‟s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage + bonus – cost of effort 
 
Some Examples 
Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 500 ECU, 
announces a bonus of 500ECU and sets suggested effort to 20. The employee 
decides to accept the offer and offer an effort level of 20. Then the employer gets 
informed about the total revenue and decides to pay a bonus of 400 ECU. What 
would the profits of the employer and employee be? 
Answer: By looking at Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of 
effort is 3000 ECU. So the profits for the employer are his/her capital of 3000 plus 
3000ECU (the total revenue) minus 500ECU (the fixed wage), minus the bonus of 
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400ECU, therefore 2900 ECU. For the employee the profits are his/her capital of 
3000ECU plus 500ECU (the fixed wage) plus the bonus of 400ECU minus the cost 
for his effort which is 420ECU (see Table 8), therefore 3480 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 700 ECU, 
announce a bonus of 500ECU and sets suggested effort to 20. He observes a total 
revenue of 1500 ECU. i) What was the effort level that the agent chose? ii)If the 
employer decides to pay a bonus of 0, what would the profits of the employer and 
employee be? 
Answer: i) The employer by looking on Table 8 can see that a total revenue of 
1500 ECU corresponds to an effort level of 10. ii) For a total revenue of 1500 ECU, 
the employer earns his/her capital of 3000 ECU plus 1500 (the total revenue) minus 
the fixed wage of 700 hence his/her profits are 3800 ECU. The employee earns his 
her capital of 3000 ECU plus 700 ECU (the fixed wage) minus the cost of effort for 
10 units of effort which is 110 ECU. Thus, the employee earns 3590 ECU.  
 
Stage 3: Contract Type 3 (practice) 
In this stage the employer instead of a bonus he/she can offer a share of the total 
revenue to the employee. This offer is binding. That is, that as long as the employer 
has offered a share of the total revenue to the employee he/she cannot change the 
offer. 
For example, a value of 0.09, 0.54 or 0.92 will correspond to 9%, 54% or 92% of 
the total revenue being given to the employee.  
Like before you can also offer a fixed wage, between 0 and 3000, and again you 
have to suggest an effort level. 
The process of the stage is the following:  
0. Before the stage starts, there are four multiple choice quizzes to check that 
you understood what your earnings will be according to your choices. 
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1. The employer chooses the size of the fixed wage, the size of the share of 
total revenue he/she wants to offer, and suggests an effort level to the 
employee.  
 
2. After being informed of the offered contract, the employee decides either to 
accept or reject the contract. 
 
3. If the employee rejects the contract the stage finishes and you move to the 
next stage. If he/she accepts the contract he/she receives the offered fixed 
wage and decides an effort level.  
 
4. After the employee had decided an effort level, the computer calculates the 
total revenue, allocates it between the employer and the employee according 
to the size of the share that each of them holds, and informs both about their 
final profits.  
 
How earnings are calculated 
For the employer, his/her profits are the employer capital, the total revenue 
generated by the employee‟s effort minus the fixed wage, minus the share of the 
total revenue he/she offered to the employee. In other words: 
Employer‟s Profit= Employer capital + total revenue – fixed wage – share * total 
revenue 
In the case of the employee, his/her profits are the employee capital, plus the fixed 
wage plus the share on the total revenue that has been offered to him/her, minus the 
cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee‟s Profit= Employee capital + fixed wage + share * total revenue – cost of 
effort 
 
 
Some Examples 
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Example 1: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 200ECU, offer a 
share of 0.2, and set suggested effort to 15. The employee decides to accept the 
offer and offer an effort level of 20. What would the profits of the employer and 
employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 20 units of 
effort is 3000 ECU. So the profits for the employer are 3000ECU (the total 
revenue) minus 100 ECU (the fixed wage), minus the share (0.2 x 3000 =600), 
therefore 2300 ECU plus the employer capital of 3000 ECU hence 5300 ECU. For 
the employee the profits are the employee capital of 3000 ECU, plus 100 ECU (the 
fixed wage) plus the share of 600 ECU minus the cost for his effort which is 420 
ECU (see Table 8), therefore, 3280 ECU. 
 
Example 2: Assume the employer decides to offer a fixed wage of 0ECU, offer a 
share of 0.6, and set suggested effort to 20. The employee decides to accept the 
offer and offer an effort level of 18. What would the profits of the employer and 
employee be? 
Answer: By looking on Table 8 we can see that the total revenue for 18 units of 
effort is 2700 ECU. So the profits for the employer are 2700 ECU (the total 
revenue), minus the share (0.6 x 2700 =1620) plus his capital of 3000 ECU, 
therefore 4080 ECU (2700-1620=1080 +3000). For the employee the profits are the 
share of 1620ECU minus the cost for his effort which is 342 ECU (see Table 8) 
plus his/her capital of 450, hence, 4278 ECU. 
 
Note: to make your calculations easier recall that a percentage of say 2%, 20%, 
100%, its equal to 0.02, 0.2 and 1 respectively.  
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Stage 4: Contract Type 1 
From now on your choices affect your earnings. You should keep in mind the clock 
on the top right side of the screen and comply with the time constraints 
This stage is the same as stage 1 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For 
how earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on 
the instruction sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 1. 
Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
 
Stage 5: Contract Type 2 
This stage is the same as stage 2 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For 
how earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on 
the instruction sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 2. 
Reminder 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
 
Stage 6: Contract Type 3 
This stage is the same as stage 3 but this time your choices affect your earnings. For 
how earnings are calculated or for the procedures of the stage you should recall on 
the instruction sheet that was given to you at the start of stage 3. 
Reminder 
Type 3: Fixed Wage + Share 
 
Stage 7: Choice among the 3 Contracts 
In this stage the employer is given the option to choose between the three possible 
contracts that you experienced before. Therefore, he/she firstly has to choose which 
of the three contracts he/she want to use and the rest of the stage follows exactly as 
in the corresponding stage you participated earlier.  
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Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
Type 3: Fixed wage + Share 
 
The process of the stage is the following:  
 
1. The employer chooses one of the three contracts. 
 
2. The remaining procedure is identical to the corresponding contract you 
practiced with before. 
 
For any queries on how earnings are calculated see the instructions that were 
provided to you. 
 
Stage 8: Choice between the 3 Contracts - repeated interaction 
This stage is identical to stage 4 with only difference that is consisted of 6 rounds in 
which you are paired with the same participant. In each round the employer has to 
choose one of the three contracts and according to his/her choice the stage 
continues. 
Note: At the start of every round both the employer‟s and employee‟s capitals are 
refreshed. In addition, if a contract is rejected the stage is not finished but you move 
to the next round of the stage. 
Reminder 
Type 1: Fixed Wage 
Type 2: Fixed Wage + Bonus 
Type 3: Fixed wage + Share  
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Effort Level Cost of Effort Total Revenue 
0 0 0 
1 2 150 
2 6 300 
3 12 450 
4 20 600 
5 30 750 
6 42 900 
7 56 1050 
8 72 1200 
9 90 1350 
10 110 1500 
11 132 1650 
12 156 1800 
13 182 1950 
14 210 2100 
15 240 2250 
16 272 2400 
17 306 2550 
18 342 2700 
19 380 2850 
20 420 3000 
Table 8: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Total Revenue 
 
 Employer Capital: 3000 ECU 
 Employee Capital: 3000 ECU 
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Chapter 2: An experimental investigation of the 
tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives. 
 
1. Introduction 
Most of the work in principal-agent theory has focused on how to design 
contracts which incentivise agents to provide the optimal, for the principal, effort 
level.  Central to this work is the Incentive Intensity Principle (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1987). The incentive intensity principle describes the optimal incentive 
intensity of the contract the principal offers to an agent when effort is not directly 
observable and contractible but instead the observed output is subject to a stochastic 
random factor. Under the assumption that the principal is risk neutral and the agent 
is risk averse, a key result of the model is that there is an inverse relationship 
between incentive intensity and the variance of the stochastic random factor which 
affects the final output. However, the evidence on the relationship between 
incentive intensity and risk are mixed (Prendergast, 1999). That led some scholars 
to describe this relationship as „tenuous‟ and to attempt to provide alternative 
justifications of why the expected relationship is not observed in the studies (i.e. 
Prendergast, 2002).  In this paper we present an experiment which tests the 
relationship between incentive intensity and risk. 
Conducting an experiment to test this relationship is important because there 
is no previous research which tested this relationship in a lab. Testing this 
relationship in a lab has two significant advantages: Firstly, in the lab there is 
enhanced control which allows obtaining more and better information on of the 
parameters of the model, and secondly, allows ruling out alternative explanations 
(i.e. other parameters) of why the relationship observed is weak. This way this 
experiment will not only provide an extra piece of evidence on the relationship 
between risk and incentive intensity experimentally, which has not been done 
before, but also indirectly test whether these alternative explanations may be the 
reason why the observed relationship is tenuous. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured in five sections: Section 2 
provides a literature review; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and 
baseline experimental predictions; Section 4 explains the experimental design. 
Section 5 presents the results, Section 6 discuss the results of the experiment and 
section 7 concludes. The experimental instructions as well as proofs for the 
theoretical prediction are provided in the appendix. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Central in principal-agent theory is the provision of incentives using pay for 
performance schemes. The key intuition is that pay for performance contracts (such 
as piece rates) are useful when there is little or no noise in between output and 
effort. If there is a lot of noise and effort cannot be distinguished by output two 
problems arise. Firstly, the piece rate is no longer a good indicator of effort. 
Secondly, if the agent is risk averse the principal would have to provide insurance 
through higher wages in order to ensure the agent‟s participation to the contract. 
The Incentive Intensity Principle (henceforth, IIP) developed by Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) examines this problem. According to the IIP the optimal intensity 
of incentives depends on four factors: i) the incremental profit generated by each 
extra unit of effort, ii) the risk tolerance of the agent, iii) the level of risk in the 
environment, and iv) the responsiveness of effort to incentives. One of the key 
results of the IIP is that risk and incentive intensity have a negative relationship.  
A recent development in the theoretical literature on incentive contracts has 
been provided by Englmaier and Wambach (2010) expanded the moral hazard 
model to incorporate the inequity aversion model of (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  
With the introduction of inequity aversion, when there is risk associated with output 
and the agents are risk averse the slope of the optimal scheme is below 1/2 in the 
First Best and tends towards the 1/2 the more inequity averse the agent is. However, 
in the Second Best, when the principal needs to incentivise the agent there are no 
clear cut predictions. This is because there are three forces in action: Inequity 
aversion which pushes towards an equal split; risk aversion which pushes towards a 
slope of 0 (i.e. flat wages); and the need to provide incentives to the agent where 
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the slope is maximal at 1. As a result, deriving predictions for incentive intensity 
under inequity aversion is a dubious task as one needs measures for both risk 
aversion, inequity aversion while also taking into account incentive compatibility. 
A relevant literature for this chapter would also be the research on risk 
elicitation procedures. Harrison and Rutström (2008) provide an extensive and 
recent review on the most commonly employed measures of risk aversion. There 
are five general types of measures of risk aversion which have been employed by 
economists. These are: the multiple price list (MPL), in which the subjects are 
given an ordered array of binary lottery choices to make all at once; the random 
lottery pairs (RLP), in which the subjects choose one of the lotteries in each pair 
and face multiple pairs in sequence; the ordered lottery selection (OLS), in which 
the subjects  select one lottery from an ordered set; the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
auction (BDM), in which the subjects are asked to choose a minimum certainty 
equivalent for a lottery that they have been endowed with; and the trade-off  (TO) 
design which is a hybrid of the others (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). The most 
notable application of the MPL is the Holt and Laury (2002) questionnaire,  the 
main weaknesses of the MPLare (a) that provides an interval estimate rather than a 
specific point estimate and (b) it can violate monotonicity, however its simplicity 
and relatively transparent procedure have made it very popular among experimental 
economists (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). The RLP design (e.g. Hey and Orme, 
1994) is easy for subjects to understand, however it is not possible to directly infer 
risk attitudes and requires some form of estimation. The OLS‟s (e.g. Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002, 2005) main disadvantage is that the use of a certain amount as a 
safe option may be perceived as a reference point to identify gains and losses. 
Lastly the BDM is very complex for subjects to understand and the TO is not 
incentive compatible (Harrison and Rutström, 2008).  Given the above we had 
concluded for the purposes of this experiment to measure risk aversion using the 
Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation questionnaire while restricting for 
monotonicity. 
The empirical evidence on the trade-off between risk and incentives are 
mixed (Prendergast, 1999). Prendergast (2002) provides a summary of the 
empirical findings of 28 papers. Out of the 28 papers only 4 found a negative 
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relationship (i.e. Brown, 1990; Garen, 1994; Bushman et al., 1996)  as theory 
predicts, while 13 found no statistically significant relationship (i.e. Lambert and 
Larker, 1987, Aggerwal and Samwick, 1998) and 11 found a positive relationship 
(i.e. Norton, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992; Core and Guay, 1999). However, there have 
been no experimental investigations of the trade-off between risk and incentives. 
Anderhub et al. (2002) conducted a simple principal-agent experiment in 
which the employer had to determine what share of the gross revenue wanted to 
offer to the agent. In their experiment there was no risk associated with output. The 
principals designed contracts which were in most of the cases incentive compatible, 
aimed at efficiency, and satisfied the participation constraint, and additionally were 
in general more generous than what standard economic theory predicts (Anderhub 
et al., 2002). On the other hand, the agents who received generous contracts 
responded by supplying effort levels above their best reply levels compared to 
agents that received „unfair‟ contracts. Furthermore, offers that were deemed 
„unfair‟ by agents had been rejected (Anderhub et al., 2002).  
According to the linear agency model the optimal effort choice of the agent 
depends on the marginal cost of effort and is unrelated to the noise in the 
performance measure. Sloof and van Praag (2008) run an experimental study to test 
this prediction and compare with expectancy theory, a theory developed by 
psychologists which predicts a negative relationship between effort and noise in the 
performance measure. In contrast to this study which focuses on the optimal choice 
of incentive intensity (β), Sloof and van Praag (2008) are focused on the optimal 
effort choice. For this reason and to reduce complexity they have opted out for the 
role of the principal to be determined exogenously. In particular the subjects were 
given the role of sales representatives who had to allocate effort between two 
different tasks /regions in each of 30 rounds. The earnings of the subjects were 
based on a performance pay measure which was split in three parts: A fixed wage, a 
share of 50% of the overall sales for region A and 50% of the overall sales in region 
B. Overall sales then depended on the effort level of the participants and the noise 
terms for each region which would differ every five rounds. Their findings are in 
line with the linear agency model as the results suggest that effort levels were 
invariant to the distributions of the noise terms. 
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3. Principal-Agent Problem  
In this section we describe the game theoretic solutions firstly for the case 
where there is no stochastic variance on output, therefore effort is observable but 
not contractible, and secondly when output is the sum of effort and a stochastic 
random factor, therefore the principal cannot distinguish which part of the output is 
due to the agent‟s effort and which part is due to the stochastic random factor.  
When there is no risk, the revenue of production depends on the agent‟s effort 
level   such that         . For providing effort, the agent bears a cost of 
        with               . The principal jointly decides on a fixed wage 
                   and a piece rate                that specifies how much 
Experimental Currency Units the agent will receive for each unit of effort. The 
agent‟s payoff is therefore given by            . Conversely, the principal‟s 
payoff is           . Assuming that both principals and agents are profit 
maximisers, the game theoretic solution predicts the principal to offer a piece rate 
of 20 and a fixed wage of 50 (due to the parameterization of the experiment) and 
the agent to exert an effort level of 10
12.  The consequent profits (after taking into 
account their endowments) for the principal        and        for the agent.  
 
When there is risk in the environment, the piece rate in output is subject to 
stochastic variance (V) which is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 
zero. Assuming the principal is risk neutral and the agent risk averse the principal 
faces a trade-off between incentivising the agent and providing him with insurance 
for the variance in payoffs that is created due to the stochastic random factor. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that the optimal incentive intensity 
(i.e. piece rate) is given by: 
   
     
          
 
                                                     
12
 For all derivations see appendix B. 
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Where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the agent. Given that 
V in our experiment was set at 2.5 and the rest of the factors remained unchanged 
the optimal    is given by: 
   
  
    
 
 
We elicited the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all subjects by using 
the Holt and Laury (2002) questionnaire. In order to generate a benchmark for our 
analysis we calculated an average   from all subjects in our experiment.13 The 
average coefficient of absolute risk aversion from all subjects who participated in 
our experiment was    = 0.549. After inserting   in equation 1 it yields the optimal 
  = 13.35. Given the optimal    the optimal effort level for the employee is 7. The 
consequent expected profits (after taking into account their endowments) for the 
principal        and        for the agent. 
 
4. Experimental Design  
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia with 360 
participants. The participants were mostly students with a variety of different 
backgrounds. The experiment was computerised in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The 
experiment employed a fictional currency, called ECU, which was converted to 
pounds at the end of the experiment at the rate of £0.02 per ECU. Each session 
lasted approximately 80 minutes and the subjects earned on average £9.60 
(approximately 15.12 US dollars), including a show-up fee of £2.00. Each session 
consisted of 10 rounds where the first three rounds where for practice (i.e. these 
rounds did not affect the subjects‟ earnings). 
 At the end of the 10 rounds the subjects had to complete the Holt and Laury 
(2002) risk elicitation questionnaire. In addition, after the completion of the Holt 
and Laury (2002) risk elicitation questionnaire the subjects had to complete, two 
                                                     
13
 Note that the model assumes that the principal is aware of the exact value of the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion for each agent. 
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non incentivised psychology questionnaires which measure risk taking and risk 
perception developed by Blais and Weber (2006). In the end of the experiment one 
of the seven rounds was chosen randomly and was paid to subjects in cash along 
with any additional earnings from the Holt and Layry (2002) task. Earnings were 
paid privately and anonymously.  A random matching procedure was implemented 
at the start of each round to control for reputation effects.  Subjects were not 
allowed to participate in more than one session. A positive frame of employer/ 
employee was adopted, instead of Type A and Type B, as context can be useful to 
enhance understanding (see Cooper and Kagel 2003 and 2009). In addition, both 
the employer /employee frame (eg. Fehr, et al. 1998) and the buyer/ seller frame 
(eg. Fehr and Gachter 2002, and Fehr et al. 2007), have been previously used in the 
context of the gift exchange with no qualitative differences between the two frames.  
The experiment consisted of three treatments: No Risk (NR), Risk (R), and 
Both in Risk (BR). We ran 30 sessions in total with 12 subjects in each session. The 
subjects were split evenly as employers or employees and maintained the same role 
throughout the experiment. 
The instructions were common for both employers and employees. Before 
the start of each session and after the subjects had read the instructions they had to 
answer control questions to ensure that all subjects have understood the 
instructions. If a subject provided the wrong answer in any question a detailed 
explanation was provided in his or her computer screen.  
All three treatments were identical in every aspect apart from how in each 
round risk affected the profit functions of the employers and employees. In the NR 
treatment, the employer had to offer an employment contract to the employee 
requesting him or her to exert a level of effort. In the employment contract, the 
employer had to specify the size of the fixed wage, piece rate and suggest an effort 
level. The fixed wage could range between 50 and 200, the piece rate between 5 
and 40, and the suggested effort level between 5 and 10.
14
 Afterwards the employee 
                                                     
14
 In order to ensure that no subject made any losses due to the variance of the random factor, we 
had decided that there would be a minimum effort level and consequently a minimum wage. To 
avoid creating any potential cues regarding which payment mechanism the employer should use. We 
split the minimum wage equally between the fixed wage and piece rate. 
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had to decide whether to accept or reject the contract offer. If the contract was 
rejected the round finished and the subjects would earn only their endowments 
which were 200 ECU. If the employee accepted the contract then he or she had to 
decide an effort level between 5 and 10. Effort was costly and the cost of effort was 
given by the function C(e) =e
2
, where e stands for effort. The total revenue for the 
employer was given by TR=50e.
15
 After the subject decided an effort level, profits 
were given by the following functions: 
 
                                                    
                                                    
 
In the R treatment the profit function of the employee was altered to 
incorporate the risk associated with the incentive measure (the piece rate). 
According to the theory the random factor is assumed to generate noise in the 
performance measure not allowing the principal to directly observe the effort 
choice of the agent.
16
 Given that the principal is assumed to be risk neutral and the 
random factor is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero, he or she 
is expected not to be affected by the associated risk in the total revenue nor on its 
impact on the piece rate. The main concern for the principal is that the random 
factor dilutes the incentives generated by the piece rate for the risk averse agent. 
According to the model the principal is assumed to be risk neutral as he or she is 
able to diversify the associated risk. However, given the principal is assigned only 
one employee this assumption would not be justifiable. In order to overcome this 
problem and ensure the principal can act as risk neutral the risk component was 
removed from his or her profit function. As a result the experimenter acts as an 
insurer for the principal allowing him to act as if he or she was risk neutral. This 
allowed us to rule out any effects from the principal being risk averse which would 
                                                     
15
 In other words the employers would receive 50 ECU for each unit of effort that was provided by 
the employee. 
16
 The random factor was presented to the subjects in the form of a table in which each possible 
value that x could take was assigned a respective probability. The table can be found in the attached 
copy of instructions in Appendix A.  
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deviate from a key assumption of the model.  Therefore, the profit function of the 
employer was held unchanged, whereas, the piece rate that was paid to the agent 
was formulated by the sum of the effort and the random factor (x).  
 
                                                          
                                                      
           
The BR treatment was run as a control treatment in order to double check 
whether imposing risk neutrality to the principal does have an effect in his or her 
behaviour. The profit function of the agent remained as in the R treatment. Whereas 
the principal in this treatment was also subject to risk.  
 
                                                             
                                                            
 
As we have shown in the previous section that the model suggests that the 
optimal piece rate β will be 20 in the NR treatment and 13.35 in the R treatment. 
This is because the employer partially ensures the employee. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The piece rate will be larger in the R treatment than in the NR 
treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The piece rate offered by the principals in the NR treatment will be 
on average equal or larger to 20 ECU per unit of effort.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The piece rate offered by the principals in the R treatment will be on 
average equal or larger to 13.35 ECU per unit of effort.  
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The agent‟s effort level is expected to depend only on the piece rate (and not 
on the fixed wage or the noise in the performance measure) offered by the principal 
as it formulates the incentive constraint of the agent. 
Hypothesis 4: Effort will depend solely to the piece rate the employer offered to the 
agent. 
Hypothesis 5: The fixed wage will have no influence on the effort level chosen by 
the agent. 
Hypothesis 6: The noise of the performance measure will have no influence on the 
effort level chosen by the agent. 
Lastly, according to the model the principal is assumed to know the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the agent in order to determine the optimal 
piece rate Although, we had initially examined the possibility of obtaining the 
coefficient of risk aversion of the agents in advance and provide it to the principals 
we believe that this information would be very difficult to be interpreted from the 
subjects. Therefore, we preferred to rely on the concept of social projection (Orbell 
and Dawes 1991). According to social projection, each player will project his own 
characteristics to others and use them as a cue on how they are more likely to 
behave.
17
 If we assume that the principal will use social projection to infer how risk 
averse the agent they are matched with is, then we can formulate the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7: The more risk averse the principal is, the more risk averse he or she 
will expect the agent to be, and as a result the smaller the piece rate that he or she 
will offer to the agent.  
 
5. Results  
In this section we firstly present the descriptive statistics and the results of 
non-parametric tests in differences in piece rates, fixed wages and effort levels 
across treatments. All tests reported here are two tailed tests and have been 
                                                     
17
 For a review of the literature in psychology on social projection see Krueger (2007).  
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conducted at session level to control for non independence of observations. We 
continue with regression analysis with respect to the piece rates and effort.  
4.1 Non-Parametric Tests  
Figures 1 to 3 presents the average fixed wage, piece rate and effort level 
across treatments respectively. Table 1 summarises the average fixed wage, piece 
rate and effort across treatments. Qualitatively, when there is uncertainty in the 
environment (R treatment) employers decide to offer on average a higher fixed 
wage and a lower piece rate than when there is no uncertainty (NR). In addition, the 
effort level is smaller in the R treatment than in the NR treatment and almost the 
same as in the BR treatment. We conducted Mann-Whitney tests for fixed wages, 
piece rates and effort levels across all three treatments. Table 2 provides a summary 
of these tests. As can be seen in Table 2,  only the difference between piece rates in 
in the R and NR treatments are statistically signinficant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.035).  
 
 
 
Fixed wage Piece rate Effort 
NR 69.93 16.51 7.44 
R 72.75 14.41 6.94 
BR 78.94 15.38 7.00 
 
Result 1: In line with hypothesis 1, the piece rate is significantly smaller in the risk 
treatment than in the NR treatment.  
One puzzling result worth investigating in future research has been that the 
piece rate in the NR treatment has been significantly smaller than the optimal and 
profit maximising piece rate of 20 (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001). 
Result 2: In contrast to hypothesis 2, on average the piece rate offered in the NR 
treatment was statistically significantly smaller than the optimal piece rate of 20.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Average Fixed Wages, Piece Rates, and 
Efforts across Treatments 
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Fixed wage Piece rate Effort 
NR - R 0.762 0.034** 0.104 
R - BR 0.273 0.199 0.734 
NR -BR 0.131 0.325 0.161 
Notes: All tests reported here are two tailed tests and have been conducted 
at session level to control for non independence of observations. 
 
 Interestingly the average piece rate that was offered by the principals in the 
R treatment was significantly larger than the piece rate predicted by the model 
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.023).  
Result 3: In contrast to hypothesis 3, on average the piece rate offered in the R 
treatment was statistically significantly larger than the predicted piece rate of 13.35.  
By conducting Spearman correlation tests between the three variables (piece 
rates, fixed wages, and effort levels), we found a very strong positive correlation 
between effort and the piece rate (as expected) of 0.81. In addition, we find a 
negative correlation between the fixed wage and the piece rate of -0.454 which 
suggest the employers would use the two mechanisms as substitutes to each other. 
 
Figure 9: Average Fixed Wage across Treatments 
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Figure 2: Average Piece Rate across Treatments 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Effort across Treatments 
 
 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
In this section we report the results of panel regressions with random effects 
at subject level and error-clustering at session level firstly for the piece rates (Table 
3) and secondly for effort (Table 4).
18
 We retained one observation per round for 
                                                     
18
 We also conducted hierarchical linear models both for the piece rate and effort using random 
effects at subject level and session level with qualitatively similar results.  
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each subject leading to 1260 observations.
19
  The regressions employ dummy 
variables for the experimental treatments. The NR treatment is used as a baseline. 
As three different measures of risk, (Holt and Laury, risk taking, and the risk 
perception) were collected, in each regression only one of them is used at each 
time. All three different measure of risk has been centered.
20
 In addition, in the 
regressions in Table 3 although in theory we should have used the Holt and Laury 
scores of the employees assuming that the employers were able to guess the level of 
risk aversion of the employee they were matched with, we considered such an 
assumption implausible and we decided to use the r coefficient of the employer 
assuming the employer would expect the employee to be as risk averse (or risk 
loving) as he or she is (relying on the literature on social projection). In addition, 
we used interaction variables between each of the risk elicitation measure and the R 
treatment to capture any potential interaction effects between risk attitudes and the 
R treatment. Lastly, we used dummy variables for British students, gender, and 
economic students. 
The results from the regressions on the piece rate in Table 3 are in parallel 
with the findings of the non parametric tests. In particular, in all the regressions that 
are presented in Table 1 the dummy variable for the R treatment is statistically 
significant at the 5% level reinstating Result 1 that the higher the variance in the 
environment the smaller the piece rate offered by the employers. In contrast, our 
control treatment (BR) was not statistically significant suggesting that the 
artificiality in which we imposed risk neutrality to the agent worked as we 
hypothesised and our result is robust.  
Result 3: There is no statistically significant difference between the average piece 
rate offered in the BR treatment  and the NR treament.  
In regressions 2 to 4 we find that risk aversion has no impact on the size of 
the piece rate. However, after we introduced interaction variables between the risk 
treatment and each of the risk elicitation measures we observe a statistically 
                                                     
19
 In one of the sessions due to technical issues the choices of the subjects on the psychology 
questionnaires were not recorded, as a consequence in the regressions which employ the psychology 
questionnaires as a dependant variable there are 1218 observations as that session is omitted.  
20
 See Dalal and Zickar (2012) for a recent discussion on the advantages of centering. 
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significant impact of the risk aversion coefficients both for the Holt and Laury and 
the risk taking tasks. 
Result 4: In line with hypothesis 5, assuming social projection, we find some 
evidence that the more risk averse the employer believes the employee is, the 
smaller the piece rate that is observed. 
Turning our attention to the regressions on the effort levels in Table 4, we 
observe that the treatment dummies have no signinficant effect in the effort levels 
as suggested by the theory. This result is persistent across all treatments. This 
finding is in line with the model‟s prediction and the findings of Sloof and van 
Praag (2008). 
Result 5: In line with hypothesis 4, the effort choices of the employees are not 
affected by the variance in the performance measure.  
However, we find highly statistically signifficant positive coefficients for 
both the fixed wage and the piece rates. Finding a positive statistically signifficant 
coefficient for the piece rate is in line with the model‟s prediction and profit 
maximising behaviour assumed in standard economic theory. However the 
significance of the fixed wage it could only be explained assuming social 
prefferences and/or reciprocal behaviour.   
Result 6: In line with hypothesis 2, the employees responded with higher effort the 
higher the piece rate that was offered by the employers.  
Result 7: In contrast to hypothesis 3, the employees responded with higher effort 
the higher the fixed wage that was offered by the employers. 
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Table 3: Panel regressions on piece rate (β) with random effects at subject level and error clustering at session level  
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 
Piece Rate (β)              
R -1.623** -1.548** -1.780** -1703**  -1.518**  -1.875**  -1.715**  
 (0.72) (0.74) (0.70) (0.76)    (0.71)    (0.65)    (0.69)    
BR -0.203 -0.157 -0.461 -0.376    -0.119    -0.587    -0.383    
 (0.69) (0.66) (0.64) (0.72)    (0.65)    (0.70)    (0.70)    
Fixed Wage -0.053**** -0.053**** -0.050**** -0.050**** -0.053**** -0.050**** -0.050**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    
Suggested Effort 1.198**** 1.199**** 1.126**** 1.122**** 1.198**** 1.119**** 1.121**** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)    (0.22)    (0.21)    (0.21)    
Holt and Laury (c)  -0.172   -0.345**   
  (0.16)   (0.17)   
Risk Taking (c)   -0.055                  -0.116**  
   (0.05)                  (0.05)  
Risk Perception (c)    -0.043      -0.046 
    (0.04)      (0.04) 
R x Holt and Laury     0.558*      
     (0.32)      
R x Risk Taking      0.179*     
      (0.09)     
R x Risk Perception       0.010    
       (0.10)    
British 1.416* 1.359* 1.512* 1.573* 1.277* 1.537* 1.573* 
 (0.78)    (0.77)    (0.80)    (0.83)    (0.77)    (0.80)    (0.84)    
Gender -0.176 -0.138 -0.294 -0.223 -0.124 -0.281 -0.231 
 (0.64)    (0.64)    (0.64)    (0.64)    (0.64)    (0.66)    (0.62)    
Economics Students -1.093 -1.089 -1.152 -0.980 -0.956 -1.402 -0.973 
 (1.47) (1.42) (1.47) (1.46) (1.42) (1.40) (1.44) 
Constant 8.163**** 8.104**** 8.781**** 8.734**** 8.075**** 8.943**** 8.750**** 
 (1.97) (1.42) (1.84) (1.87) (1.86) (1.81) (1.84) 
Obs 1260 1260 1218 1218 1260 1218 1218 
R
2
 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.23 
Prob > Χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01,**** p<0.001, standard errors provided in parentheses. In regressions where the Risk Taking and Risk Perception 
measures are employed (Reg. 3, 4,6, and 7) there are 42 less observations as in one of the sessions these variables were not recorded. 
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Table 4: Panel regressions on effort (e) with random effects at subject level and error clustering at session level 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 
Effort (e)        
R  0.077  0.094  0.123 0.093  0.086 0.115 0.044 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
BR -0.232 -0.209 -0.127 -0.216 -0.225 -0.139 -0.217 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
Fixed Wage 0.012**** 0.012**** 0.012**** 0.012**** 0.012**** 0.012**** 0.012**** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Piece Rate 0.285**** 0.285**** 0.286**** 0.285**** 0.285**** 0.285**** 0.286**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Suggested Effort -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Holt and Laury (c)  -0.020   -0.004   
  (0.03)   (0.04)   
Risk Taking (c)   -0.020                  - 0.017  
   (0.01)                  (0.02)  
Risk Perception (c)    -0.004     -0.016 
    (0.01)      (0.01) 
R x Holt and Laury     -0.055   
     (0.93)   
R x Risk Taking      0.011     
      (0.03)     
R x Risk Perception       0.040    
       (0.03)    
British 0.252 0.242 0.187 0.233 0.236 0.188 0.259 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
Gender 0.184 0.191 0.220 0.205 0.202 0.230 0.236 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
Economics Students -0.389 -0.369 -0.357 -0.400 -0.365 -0.364 -0.317 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.30) 
Constant 1.902**** 1.879**** 1.818**** 1.863**** 1.885**** 1.885**** 1.842**** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
Obs 1260 1260 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 
R
2
 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 
Prob >  Χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01,**** p<0.001, standard errors provided in parentheses. In regressions where the Risk Taking and Risk Perception 
measures are employed (Reg. 3, 4,6, and 7) there are 42 less observations as in one of the sessions these variables were not recorded. 
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6. Discussion 
Our findings with respect to the relationship between risk and incentive intensity are in 
line with the predictions of the Incentive Intensity Principle. As a result our evidence provide 
support to the argument that previous empirical studies which found a positive or no 
relationship at all  may have been due to the variety of other factors which could be affecting 
their data and are not included in the initial model. As a result our findings provide support to 
theorists who introduced alternative dimensions or additional variables in order to explain the 
observed positive relationship in previous studies (e.g. Prendergast, 2002). 
A puzzling result has been that in the treatment where there was no variance on the 
output (NR treatment) the observed piece rates were significantly smaller than the optimal 
piece rate. This finding is in contrast to similar studies which observed that the employers not 
only offered contracts which are incentive compatible (Anderhub, et al. 2002, but also the first 
chapter of this thesis) but also which were more generous than the theoretical prediction. One 
explanation could be that the employers were expecting the employee to exert a higher effort 
due to the fixed wage that was also offered along with the piece rate. An alternative 
explanation may be that the use of a minimum wage, (which was introduced to ensure no 
loses) may created a reference point leading to the employers to offer smaller wages.
21
 
However, previous studies which focused on the effects of minimum wages have found that 
the use of minimum wages increases the average wages offered (Owen and Kagel, 2010) and 
the reservation utilities of the employees (Falk et al. 2006). Yet in these studies the 
experimental games resembled the gift exchange which is not possible to do an incentive 
compatible contract offer (except of a 0 offer) and necessitates pro-social behaviour. 
Interestingly we find that the employees responded with higher effort levels for both 
higher piece rates and fixed wages. The response with higher effort the higher the piece rate 
offered (ceteris paribus) is in line with the predictions of the model, and more generally with 
the assumption of profit maximising behaviour. However, finding a positive relationship 
between the fixed wage and effort can only be explained with social preferences. Indeed, a 
positive relationship between the fixed wage and effort is in line with previous experimental 
                                                     
21
 A relevant and related literature to this interpretation would be the one on demand effects.  For a discussion on 
demand effects see Zizzo (2010). 
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studies (Falk et al. 1999; Fehr et. al, 1998; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004, 
2007).  
It could be argued that a limitation of this study is that effort is measured in an abstract 
manner by allocating a decision number (i.e. subjects had to choose an effort level ranging 
from 5 to 10). This may create external validity concerns as compared to subjects performing 
a real effort task (Sloof and van Praag, 2008). However, using real effort tasks would generate 
different marginal costs of effort for each agent as subjects would differ in ability. This in turn 
creates an extra layer of complexity for the employer who would have not known what the 
cost of effort faced by the agent is. Therefore, although a real effort task could increase 
external validity, in order to minimise noise we chose to use an artificial effort task. 
 
7. Conclusion  
To conclude, despite previous studies have found mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between risk and incentive intensity, our findings are in line with the negative 
relationship expected by the model. Our findings are the first to test experimentally the trade-
off between risk and incentives which allowed for greater control and formulating an 
environment as close as possible to the model. In addition, we find no relation between the 
variance in the performance and the effort choice of the agent as well as a strong positive 
relation between the effort choice of the agents and the piece rate offered by the principal, 
also in line with the model‟s prediction. Moreover, the agents seemed to respond positively to 
higher fixed wages suggesting reciprocal behaviour which is in line with previous 
experimental studies on labour contracts (and particular the literature on gift exchange. 
However, we observed that the majority of the offers in the no risk treatment were offering a 
suboptimal piece rate which is surprisingly different to previous studies. A potential 
explanation for the lower offers may be our use of a minimum wage which may have acted as 
a reference point for the employers driving downwards the offers of the principals. Future 
research could investigate if the introduction of a low minimum wage leads to employment 
suboptimal contract offers. 
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Appendix A - Instructions 
Instructions (NR Treatment) 
 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. 
The experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants. If you face any questions at any moment please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the 
exchange rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice 
rounds, this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you 
understand and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be 
chosen randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will 
randomly match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an 
employee with an employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not 
know with whom of the other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
1) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting 
him/her to exert a level of effort.  
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2) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and he/she 
decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
 
3) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits of 
both and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to 
exert. After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think 
what contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If 
you are the employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the 
given contract taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses which ranges 
from 5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the 
corresponding employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x effort. 
That means that for every unit of effort the employee exerts the employer earns 50 ECU. 
For example, if the employee exerts an effort of 3 the employer earns 150 ECU. 
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Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee which is 
independent of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can 
range from 0 to 200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of effort. An example of that could be an apple 
picker. If the employee was an apple picker a piece rate would mean a specific amount of 
money (ECU) for every basket of apples (effort) he brings to the employer. For example for a 
piece rate of 20, and an effort level of 5 the employee will be paid 20x5= 100 ECU i.e. the 
employee earns 100 ECU. (The piece rate can range from 0 to 40 including one decimal (i.e. 
10.1, 23.4, 30.5 etc.). 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is not 
bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given range 
of 0 to 5.        
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
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The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is at least 
compensated for his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a 
minimum fixed wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5.  
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU he received at the start of the round, 
plus the revenue generated by the employee’s effort, minus the fixed wage he/she paid and 
minus the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x Effort 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 100 ECU plus the fixed wage plus 
the piece rate times the effort, minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x Effort – Cost of Effort 
 
Overview 
5. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 0 to 350), the piece rate (0 to 50) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
 
6. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract 
the stage finishes. If he accepts the contract, he receives the offered fixed wage and 
decides an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
 
7. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the 
earnings of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
 
8. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
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Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 0 
   Suggested Effort 10 
  
     
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
250 
 
 
Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  350 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 0 
   Suggested Effort 10 
  
     
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
50 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
475 
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Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  25 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20 
   Suggested Effort 10 
  
     
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
425 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
275 
 
 
Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  25 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30 
   Suggested Effort 8 
  
     
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
325 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
375 
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Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7 
   Suggested Effort 5 
  
     
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
353 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
347 
 
 
Instructions (R Treatment) 
 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. 
The experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants. If you face any questions at any moment please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the 
exchange rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
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The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice 
rounds, this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you 
understand and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be 
chosen randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will 
randomly match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an 
employee with an employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not 
know with whom of the other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
4) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting 
him/her to exert a level of effort.  
 
5) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and he/she 
decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
 
6) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits of 
both and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to 
exert. After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think 
what contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If 
you are the employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the 
given contract taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
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Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses which ranges 
from 5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the 
corresponding employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x effort. 
That means that for every unit of effort the employee exerts the employer earns 50 ECU. 
For example, if the employee exerts an effort of 3 the employer earns 150 ECU. 
 
 
Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee which is 
independent of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can 
range from 0 to 200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of output. Output is the sum of effort + a luck 
value. An example of that could be an apple picker. If the employee was an apple picker a 
piece rate would mean a specific amount of money (ECU) for every basket of apples 
(output) he brings to the employer. And the luck factor could be how favourable or 
unfavourable the weather conditions has been. The piece rate can range from 5 to 40. For 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
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example, for a piece rate of 10, an effort level of 3, and a luck value of 2, it means the 
employee will be paid 10x(3+2)= 50 i.e. the employee earns 50 ECU. 
Table 2 show the values luck may take (that is from -5 to 5) and what is the chance for each 
of these values to be selected by the computer. For example, the chance the luck value to 
turn out to be -5 is one out of a hundred, for  -1 is sixteen out of a hundred, for 2 is twelve 
out of a hundred etc. 
 
 
Luck Chance 
-5 1% 
-4 4% 
-3 7% 
-2 12% 
-1 16% 
0 18% 
1 16% 
2 12% 
3 7% 
4 4% 
5 1% 
 
 
The earnings for the employee from the piece rate are calculated by the ECU value chosen 
from the employer (from 5 to 40) multiplied by the output which is the sum of the effort 
and luck (i.e. piece rate x (effort + luck)). Note that luck  only affects the earnings of the 
employee. 
 
 
An example (numbers are purely illustrative) 
 
Table 2: Chance of each luck factor to happen 
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Assume: a) the employer chooses to set the piece rate at the value of 5, b) the employee 
chooses an effort of 5 and the luck value turns out to be -2.  
 
The employee’s from the piece rate are the piece rate times the sum of effort and luck (i.e. 
5 x (5+(-2))= 5 x 3 = 15) which is 15 ECU plus the 100 ECU minus the cost of effort for 5 units 
of effort which is 28. Therefore the employee will earn 115 – 28 which is 87 ECU.  
 
For the employer however the earnings are calculated without considering the luck value. 
Therefore, the employer will receive 25 x 5 (the revenue from 5 units of effort) minus the 
piece rate which will be 5 (the piece rate) times the effort of the employee which was 5 plus 
the 100 ECU that is given to him at the start of the round. Hence 125 – 25 + 100 leading to 
earnings of 100 ECU. 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is 
not bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given 
range of 0 to 5.        
 
The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is at least 
compensated for his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a 
minimum fixed wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5.  
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU he received at the start of the round, 
plus the revenue generated by the employee’s effort, minus the fixed wage he/she paid and 
minus the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x Effort 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 100 ECU plus the fixed wage plus 
the piece rate times the sum of effort and the luck factor, minus the cost of effort. In other 
words:  
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Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x (Effort+ luck) – Cost of Effort 
 
Note that the luck factor affects only the employee! 
 
 
Overview 
9. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 50 to 200), the piece rate (5 to 40) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
 
10. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract 
the stage finishes. If he accepts the contract, he receives the offered fixed wage and 
decides an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
 
11. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the 
earnings of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
 
12. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
 
Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 5 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck 0 
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
350 
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Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 10 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck -2 
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
200 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
405 
 
 
 
 Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck +2 
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
390 
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Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30 
   Suggested Effort 8 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck -5 
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
350 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
300 
 
 
Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7 
   Suggested Effort 5 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck +5 
     Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x Effort 
277 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
472 
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Instructions (BR Treatment) 
 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. 
The experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants. If you face any questions at any moment please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the 
exchange rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice 
rounds, this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you 
understand and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be 
chosen randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will 
randomly match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an 
employee with an employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not 
know with whom of the other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
7) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting 
him/her to exert a level of effort.  
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8) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and he/she 
decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
 
9) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits of 
both and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to 
exert. After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think 
what contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If 
you are the employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the 
given contract taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses which ranges 
from 5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the 
corresponding employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x (Effort + Luck). 
Luck is a number that is randomly chosen by the computer and can range from -5 to 5.  
That means that for every unit of effort (assume luck is 0) the employee decides, the 
employer earns 50 ECU. For example, if the employee decides an effort of 3 the employer 
earns 150 ECU. 
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Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee which is 
independent of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can 
range from 50 to 200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of output. Output is the sum of effort and the luck 
value. An example of that could be an apple picker. If the employee was an apple picker a 
piece rate would mean a specific amount of money (ECU) for every basket of apples 
(output) he brings to the employer. And the luck factor could be how favourable or 
unfavourable the weather conditions have been. The piece rate can range from 5 to 40. For 
example, for a piece rate of 10, an effort level of 5, and a luck value of 2, it means the 
employee will be paid 10x(5+2)= 70 i.e. the employee earns 70 ECU. 
Table 2 show the values luck may take (that is from -5 to 5) and what is the chance for each 
of these values to be selected by the computer. For example, the chance the luck value to 
turn out to be -5 is one out of a hundred, for -1 is sixteen out of a hundred, for 2 is twelve 
out of a hundred etc. 
 
 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
85 
 
 
 
Luck Chance 
-5 1% 
-4 4% 
-3 7% 
-2 12% 
-1 16% 
0 18% 
1 16% 
2 12% 
3 7% 
4 4% 
5 1% 
 
 
The earnings for the employee from the piece rate are calculated by the ECU value chosen 
from the employer (from 5 to 40) multiplied by the output which is the sum of the effort 
and luck (i.e. piece rate x (effort + luck)).  
 
 
An example (numbers are purely illustrative) 
 
Assume: a) the employer chooses to set the piece rate at the value of 5, b) the employee 
chooses an effort of 5 and the luck value turns out to be -2.  
 
The employee’s earnings from the piece rate are the piece rate times the sum of effort and 
luck (i.e. 5 x (5+(-2))= 5 x 3 = 15) which is 15 ECU plus the 200 ECU minus the cost of effort 
for 5 units of effort which is 28. Therefore the employee will earn 215 – 28 which is 187 
ECU.  
Table 2: Chance of each luck factor to happen 
86 
 
 
The employer will receive 50 x (5-2), which equals to 150 ECU, minus the piece rate which 
will be 15 plus the 200 ECU that is given to him at the start of the round. Hence 150 – 15 + 
200 leading to earnings of 3250 ECU. 
 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is 
not bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given 
range of 5 to 10.        
 
The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is compensated for 
his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a minimum fixed 
wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5. This way it is ensured that neither the employers nor 
the employees can make losses. 
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU he received at the start of the round, 
plus the revenue generated by the sum of the employee’s effort and the luck factor, minus 
the fixed wage he/she paid and minus the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 200 ECU plus the fixed wage plus 
the piece rate times the sum of effort and the luck factor, minus the cost of effort. In other 
words:  
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x (Effort+ luck) – Cost of Effort 
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Overview 
13. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 50 to 200), the piece rate (5 to 40) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
 
 
14. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract 
the stage finishes. If he accepts the contract, he receives the offered fixed wage and 
decides an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
 
 
15. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the 
earnings of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
 
 
16. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
 
Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 5 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck 0 
     Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage 
– Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
350 
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Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 10 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck -2 
     Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage – Piece 
Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
120 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
405 
 
 
 Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20 
   Suggested Effort 10 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck +2 
     Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage 
– Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
510 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
390 
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Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30 
   Suggested Effort 8 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck -5 
     Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage 
– Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
250 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
300 
 
 
Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices 
 
Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50 
 
Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7 
   Suggested Effort 5 
 
Computer Choices 
   
Luck +5 
     Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage 
– Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
403 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
472 
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Appendix B – The P-A and Theoretic Predictions 
 
The Parameters of Experimental Implementation 
There are two individuals a principal P and an agent A. The principal wants to hire the Agent 
to exert effort e. For every unit of effort exerted by the agent the principal earns 50 ECU
22
.  
However, effort is costly for the agent and is given by C(e). The principal uses a linear 
incentive scheme to hire the agent. When there is no risk and effort is observable the 
principal‟s profit function is defined as: 
                                                                                                                         (1) 
The agent‟s profit when there is no risk is defined as: 
                                                                                                                         (2) 
The Total Revenue is given by: 
                                                                                                                                   (3) 
The cost of effort is a strictly increasing and convex function in effort: 
                                                                                                                                       (4) 
 
With: 
  ... Unconditional fixed wage 
                      
  ... The piece rate paid to the agent for each unit of effort. 
                  
  ... Effort level revealed by the agent 
                 
 
                                                     
22
 ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units 
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The game theoretic solution 
Given the above parameters the participation constraint, i.e. the constraint that has to be met 
in order to make any contract offer monetarily beneficial is: 
                                                                                                                                (5) 
 
Any offer that does not satisfy (5) if accepted would imply the agent would make losses. 
The principal wants to: 
                 
Given that the agent would accept any contract that satisfies (5) the minimum amount that 
has to be transferred to the agent has to be equal to     . Hence, 
             
The principal‟s maximization problem becomes 
                                                                                                                             (6) 
Inserting the actual parameters used in the experiment results in 
               
Maximizing by   results in 
     
Thus the optimal effort level would be 25. As the experimental parameters only allow  
                , the maximisation problem in (6) has a corner solution23 of       .  
Maximizing (2) with respect to    leads to  
β        and 
β       
                                                     
23
 As in the previous chapter , the choice for a corner solution was made to reduce complexity to an already 
highly complex design from the perspective of the principal. This choice though bears the cost that will be 
harder to test if the principals had correctly identified that e* is the optimum effort level or if they chose it ad 
hoc simply following a rule of thumb such as the more the better. Nevertheless, the use of corner solutions has 
been a standard approach to experiments which investigated contract design and social preferences. 
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Inserting the above calculated effort level       and solving for β, finally provides the 
minimum piece rate β*. Thus, 
β
                                                                                                  (7) 
Thus, the incentive contract is incentive compatible for any value of  β    . 
With β = β   the consequent profits (after taking into account their endowments) for the 
principal        and        for the agent.  
 
When there is risk in the environment the principal is assumed to be able to observe the final 
output (i.e. Total Revenue) but he or she is unable to observe what part of this output is due 
to the agent‟s effort and what is due to randomness.  In this case the total revenue function 
can be expressed the following way: 
                                                                                                                            (8) 
With: 
  ... Stochastic random factor 
            
 
Assuming the principal is risk neutral he or she will maximise expected profit: 
                    )                                                                                       (9) 
Given the principal is risk neutral and             the profit function of the principal can 
be re-written as: 
               )                                                                                                     (10) 
However, given the agent is risk averse his or her expected profit is given by: 
               
 
 
                                                                                        (11) 
Where: 
 r = coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the agent 
Given profit functions 10 and 11 Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1987) have shown that optimal 
incentive intensity β is given by: 
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Where:          
Proof 
             
 
 
         
The agent will choose e to maximise his or her expected profit. 
F.O.C. 
        (Incentive Constraint)                                                                                          (12) 
 
Given the agent‟s reservation utility is assumed to be 0 the principal needs to satisfy the 
following participation constraint: 
          
 
 
                                                                                                          (13) 
 
Principal‟s net profit is given by: 
               , substituting equation 13 leads to 
              
 
 
   , substituting equation 12 for β,  
              
 
 
           
F.O.C. 
   
  
                                 
                              
                       , substituting β for C’(e) 
                   and solving for β 
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Given that V in our experiment was set at 2.5 and the rest of the factors remained unchanged 
the optimal    is given by: 
   
  
    
 
 
We elicited the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all subjects by using the Holt and 
Laury (2002) questionnaire. In order to generate a benchmark for our analysis we calculated 
an average   from all subjects in our experiment.24 The average coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion from all subjects who participated in our experiment was    = 0.549. After inserting 
  in equation 1 it yields the optimal   = 13.35. Given the optimal    the optimal effort level 
for the employee is 7. The consequent expected profits (after taking into account their 
endowments) for the principal        and        for the agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24
 Note that the model assumes that the principal is aware of the exact value of the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion for each agent. 
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Chapter 3: Obedience25 
 
 
 
“I know the power obedience has of making things  
easy which seem impossible” 
Saint Teresa of Avila (1972:36), “The interior castle” 
1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a simple experiment on the role of authority and 
obedience in an experiment where obedience damages other people‟s earnings. 
Principal agent models are the standard conceptual framework by which economists 
consider authority, but their focus is on analyzing the effect of different pay 
structures on decision making by agents. While social preferences have been 
usefully modeled within this framework (Englmeier and Wambach, 2010), 
consideration has not been given to how authority per se may help induce 
compliance. There has been considerable attention in economics to conformism and 
social norms, by which subjects tend to do what a number of others do (e.g. Asch, 
1955; Jones, 1984; Lopez-Perez, 2008; Zafar, 2011), and there is of course a 
significant empirical literature on peer effects (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; 
Kawaguchi, 2004; Powell et al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006) and on social image and 
pro-social behavior (e.g., Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; 
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009), but the focus of this research 
has been on what we may label as horizontal social pressure, i.e. pressure by 
peers.
26
 There has also been some insightful attention to the study of leadership as a 
                                                     
25
 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with my supervisor Prof. Daniel Zizzo. 
26
 The difficulties with identification in peer effects estimations imply that this is an area where 
experimental research is especially useful (e.g. Manski, 1993). In psychology, the connection is with 
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way of helping to solve social dilemmas or weakest link type coordination 
problems (Moxnes and van Heijden, 2003; Brandts et al., 2007; Guth et al., 2007; 
van der Heijden et al., 2008), but the leaders in this literature are just peers whose 
actions may facilitate cooperation and contribution within groups. 
The question we wish to draw the attention of economists to with this chapter 
is instead the following: can vertical, i.e. hierarchical, social pressure induce 
conformism, even when there is no financial reason for obeying, and even when the 
domain for the action to be undertaken by the agent is anti-social, i.e. contrary to 
the standard social norm of not damaging others? If so, this should be taken into 
account in principal agent modeling and more generally in thinking about 
incentives and delegation in organizations. It is notable to contrast the economist‟s 
perspective, which does away with the motivation to obey an authority, with that of 
psychologists such as Cialdini and Goldstein (2004, p. 596) when they say that 
“most organizations would cease to operate efficiently if deference to authority 
were not one of the prevailing norms.”  
In this chapter we capture deference to authority as social image utility 
towards the authority.  Intuitively, there is good reason to believe that subjects may 
typically care at least as much if not more of social image with respect to an 
authority than with respect to peers. Sliwka (2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson 
(2008) contain important models that consider different aspects of how the social 
image that the agent feels as a response to the incentive structure by the principal 
matters, and may in turn shape the incentive contract chosen by the principal. Our 
starting point is the same, but our focus is on whether the agent has a drive to obey 
as a result of social image utility towards the authority. In this respect, the choice of 
an anti-social domain for the action to be undertaken by the agent, namely to 
destroy half of their partner‟s earnings, is especially useful to control for potential 
                                                                                                                                                    
traditional research on the value of conformism to peers (e.g., Asch, 1955) and on influence (e.g., 
Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). 
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explanations of changes in behavior based on social norms to be pro-social (as in, 
e.g., Bicchieri, 2006; Keizer et al., 2008; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). 
The focus on the domain of destructive behavior is of interest in its own right. 
No doubt, obedience as a character trait is generally perceived as a virtue that ought 
to be praised and promoted within society.
27
 Equally, blind obedience can lead to 
catastrophic outcomes. In his defense on the court in Jerusalem for his role in the 
Holocaust and his crimes against the Jews, Eichmann claimed that “he did his duty 
[...] he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law" (Arendt, 1963: 135) and as 
a consequence he was innocent. Arendt (1963) argued that the biggest crimes in 
history were implemented by ordinary people who were obedient to orders. Within 
social psychology, the paradigmatic case is provided by Milgram‟s (1963, 1974) 
series of psychology experiments with deception and a strong authority presence 
verbally and with increasing pressure requiring subjects, for the sake of science, to 
press a button supposedly to implement an escalating series of electricity shocks to 
a confederate every time the latter provided a wrong answer: 62.5% of the subjects 
continued up to the maximum 450 volts electric shock.
28
 
In most economic organizations, typically economic stakes rather than 
physical harm are involved and there is a much subtler role of authority. The desire 
for conformity may be seen to stem from maximizing the social image that the 
subject has with respect to the authority and, when conformity is to an anti-social 
act as harming others, may correspondingly minimize the moral costs from 
destruction, as the responsibility of being nasty is perceived to fall with the 
authority rather than oneself.
29
 The outcome is the willingness to act aggressively 
                                                     
27
 For instance, Alwin (1990) showed that parents value obedience as one of the top three 
characteristics for a child to have. 
28
 Similar results have been found under a range of variants and of subject pools (e.g., Kilham and 
Mann, 1974; Shanab and Yahya, 1977, 1978; Meeus and Raaijmakers, 1995; Blass, 1999). 
29
 See Abbink and Herrmann (2011) for a discussion of the „moral costs of being nasty‟. 
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towards other individuals because of obedience to the cue provided by the 
authority.
30
 
There is a natural way to implement authority in the laboratory, and that is by 
exploiting the authority of the experimenter: subjects view the experimenter as 
being in a position of authority due to its legitimacy and expertise about the 
experimental environment (Orne 1962, 1973; Rosnow and Rosenthal 1997; Zizzo, 
2010). Which is to say that (like Milgram, if more subtly) we use experimenter 
demand as our tool to study obedience: it is, in other words, for us precisely the 
object of investigation that we ride and look at the effects of rather than a confound 
to be isolated and controlled for. Indeed one motivation of our experiment, if of 
interest primarily only for experimental economists, is methodological: that is, to 
verify the extent to which experimental demand can affect behavior. Our main 
motivations however are more general: we look at to what extent authority is 
effective, even in a context where it implies going against standard social norms of 
norms and inducing damage to other people at no economic benefit (and indeed 
some economic cost) to one‟s own; and, relatedly, at whether we can shed at least 
some light on the factors that induce more or less obedience. Factors we consider 
are the effect of having more pressure to obey at given intervals of time, the effect 
of having an explicit reason to destroy and the expectation that the partner may 
damage back. 
Our experiment employs the „Joy of Destruction game‟ of Abbink and 
Herrmann (2011) as our baseline, where subjects are given the option to destroy 
half of the earnings of another subject at a price with no material benefit. 
Predictions can then be drawn straightforwardly using a simple model incorporating 
both social image and social preferences considerations. Our qualitative results are 
comparable to those of Abbink and Herrmann (2011), and, while arguably creating 
                                                     
30
 This would explain the fact that subordinates in organisations may not worry about the ethical 
implications of their actions if cued by the authority (Ashford and Anand, 2003; Darley, 2001), e.g. 
becoming willing to engage in race discrimination (Brief et al., 1995). 
99 
 
already some indirect demand to destroy, repeating the question 10 times does not 
make any statistical difference, with destruction rates still lower than 20%. 
However, when indirect pressure is reinforced by an explicit demand in the 
instructions to reduce their partners‟ income, even if there is no explicit reason 
provided, the destruction rates more than doubles to over 40%. Asking subjects to 
destroy in specific intervals in time increases destruction rates further to around 
60%, a result robust to providing an explicit justification for destruction or 
removing the potential for reciprocal aggression. Additional information is 
provided by qualitative data asking about the perceived objective of the experiment 
and by the use of a psychological social desirability scale that measures the extent 
of sensitivity to social pressure (Zizzo and Fleming, 2011; Stober, 2001). Overall, 
the evidence supports an explanation based on social image utility towards the 
authority (and corresponding moral costs from destruction being minimized). 
There are a number of other connected strands of research. One is about 
experimenter demand characteristics by which a number of experiments are 
criticized on the grounds that experimental subjects may change their behavior due 
to implicit cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior (Orne, 1962; Rosnow 
and Rosenthal, 1997; Zizzo, 2010). Other related literature is where information is 
provided on others‟ behavior e.g. in the context of giving (Cason and Mui, 1998; 
Frey and Meier, 2004; Landry et al., 2006; Krupka and Weber, 2008; Shang and 
Croson, 2009; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009) or of public good contribution (Bardsley 
and Sausgruber, 2005), or where there are exogenous recommendations given in 
contexts where it can serve one‟s own self interest, such as threshold public good 
games (Croson and Marks, 2001) or as a device to solve coordination in Chicken 
games (Cason and Sharma, 2007; Duffy and Feltovich, 2008). Cadsby et al. (2006) 
comes perhaps closest to our experiment in requiring subjects to pay a cost in a pro-
social context; their manipulation is stronger than ours in that subjects are not 
simply requested but also expected to act in line with the request of the 
experimenter authority; subjects are given an explicit reason to give which is to 
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help fund future experiments. Counter to the usual emphasis of behavioral 
economists on cooperation, there is a small but growing body of research on 
antisocial behavior to which this chapter is also related to.
31
 This research finds that 
there are conditions under which subjects are willing to pay money to damage 
other‟s earnings, even at a cost to their own (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003; 
Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 2011; Abbink et al., 2010).
32
 
There are also conditions in which „antisocial‟ punishment takes place (Nikiforakis, 
2008, Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2008, Herrmann et al., 2008 and Denant-
Boemont et al., 2007).  
Section 2 describes the game and considers how different considerations such 
as social image towards the authority and peers, anticipated reciprocity, inequality 
aversion and spite affect its predictions. Section 3 provides the experimental design 
and specific hypotheses in the light of it and of Section 2. Section 4 presents the 
results, section 5 some supplementary analysis and section 6 the discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Joy of Destruction Game with Obedience 
The One Sided Joy of Destruction Game 
There are two players, X and Y, with payoffs respectively x and y. X is sent 
the cue by the authority to destroy. If X chooses to destroy, X loses 1 Guilder and Y 
loses 5 Guilders, which means an advantageous inequality (i.e. x > y) equal to 4, 
and the indicator variable IDX is set equal to 1; if not, it is equal to 0. If there is 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. x < y, then the indicator variable Ii is equal to 1; if 
not, it is equal to 0; this case cannot occur in this one sided game. If there is 
                                                     
31
 Herrmann and Orzen (2008) refer to this as homo rivalis behavior. 
32
 Abbink and Herrmann‟s (2011) idea that subjects are more willing to engage in antisocial 
behavior if the moral cost of it is lower has some parallelism with the „moral wriggle room‟ 
literature (e.g., Dana et al., 2007). 
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advantageous inequality, which will always occur in this version of the game if the 
player obeys, then the indicator variable Ij is equal to 1; if not, it is equal to 0. 
Define, as per Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the weight on disadvantageous inequality 
si as larger (or at least as large) than that on advantageous inequality sj: that is, si ≥ 
sj. We also impose the restrictions that si > 0 (disadvantageous inequality hurts) and 
si ≥ sj . This second restriction allows for spite in the sense that it is possible for 
the weight on advantageous inequality to be negative, and simply states that players 
would not be more spiteful when being ahead than when being behind. When 
positive, si  and sj can also be seen to potentially reflect, in reduced form, any 
reciprocity concern that X may have towards Y, without needing additional terms 
in the utility function; we can see this already in this one sided game for the case of 
sj, since the only case that advantageous inequality can occur in this game is if X 
has been unkind to Y and may feel guilty as a result.
33
  
We want to model social image concerns, which could equivalently be seen to 
reflect the moral costs of nastiness towards either the authority or the other player 
(the partner).
34
 If X obeys, X gets social image warm glow with respect to the 
authority, i.e. obedience utility Ds ; if not, X gets social image warm glow with 
respect to the partner  Ns . Ds  could also be seen to model any pure joy of 
destruction motive (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011) that the player has. We restrict 
Ds  and Ns to be non-negative, i.e. Ds , Ns ≥ 0. ( Ds  - Ns ) can be interpreted as the 
net social image utility of destruction. We can now write down X‟s utility function 
UX as follows:  
                                                     
33
 For a sophisticated and general guilt aversion model, see Battigalli and Dufwemberg (2009). 
Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Cox et al. (2007) are examples of 
social preferences models allowing for reciprocity. 
34
 To clarify this, each action can be seen as associated to a moral cost. This moral cost is such that 
X gets utility sD if X obeys, in the sense that sD is the social image utility net of the moral cost of 
obedience. Similarly, the moral cost from not obeying is such that X gets utility sN by not obeying. 
Note also that we do not exclude the possibility that sD may reflect a rule of thumb of relying on the 
cue provided by the authority.  
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(1) )()()1( yxsIxysIsIsIxU jjiiNDXDDXX   
 
Claim 1. X obeys and destroys if and only if the net social image utility of 
destruction and/or if spite is sufficiently high. 
Proof: Define a threshold variable .141  jND sss  Given (1) and the 
game parameters, obedience is chosen iff ,01  which, in order to hold, requires 
either a sufficiently high ( Ds  - Ns ) or a sufficiently negative sj weight or a 
combination of the two. 
 
The Two Sided Joy of Destruction Game 
This is the game used by Abbink and Herrmann (2011). Both players 
simultaneously decide whether or not to destroy 5 Guilders of the partner‟s 
endowment, at an own cost of 1 Guilder. Define IDY an indicator variable equal to 1 
if player Y chooses to destroy (else 0). The utility function of player Y can be 
written, symmetrically to (1), as: 
(2) )()()1( xysIyxsIsIsIyU jjiiNDDDYY   
Given the experimental parameters and utility functions (1) and (2), Table 1 
represents the game payoff matrix, labeling the actions as either D (Destroy) or N 
(Not Destroy), and Figure 1 represents the Nash equilibria of the game in the light 
of Claim 2, as stated next.
35
 (N, D), the only case where player X ends up with less 
than Y, is also the only case where X is kind to Y while Y is being unkind back
36
 
and so the si  weight can be postulated to incorporate also negative reciprocity 
                                                     
35
 In what follows we focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria only; mixed strategies equilibria are 
implausible here, bearing in mind that, even in treatments where (as described later) there are 
repeated requests to destroy, a decision to destroy can only be taken once and concludes the game. 
36
 The symmetrical claim applies to Y in relation to outcome (D, N). 
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concerns as well as the disutility from disadvantageous inequality. Define the 
threshold variable .142  iND sss        
 
Figure 1. Predictions in the Joy of Destruction Game 
 
Notes. N stands for Not destroy and D stands for Destroy. Ds  is the social image 
utility towards the authority from destruction (inclusive of any joy of destruction). 
21   and    are threshold variables as defined in the main text. 
 
Claim 2. If ,0, 21  (D, D) is the strictly dominant strategy. If 
,0  and  0 21    both (D, D) and (N, N) are Nash equilibria. If ,0, 21  (N, N) 
is the strictly dominant strategy. Therefore, destruction is chosen if and only if the 
net social image utility from obedience and/or if spite is sufficiently high, whereas 
non destruction is chosen if and only if the net social image utility from obedience 
is sufficiently low and/or the weight on disadvantageous inequality is sufficiently 
high. 
Proof: Trivial given the payoff matrix in Table 1, from which immediately 
follows that (N, N) is a Nash equilibrium iff  ,01  while (D, D) is a Nash 
equilibrium if 02  and a set of equilibria where both conditions hold is non-
empty since 21    always as si ≥ sj . Also note that iff 0, 21  players strictly 
(a) 1 Sided Game
(b) 2 Sided Game
D
(N, N) (N, N) and (D, D) (D, D)
N
Ds
Ds
01 
02  01 
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prefer N regardless the partner‟s choice, thus ensuring that (N, N) is strictly 
dominant; equally, 0, 21  means that players strictly prefer D regardless of the 
partner, thus ensuring strict dominance of (D, D). The second part of the claim just 
puts the equilibrium conditions into words. 
 
Claim 3. Under pure self-interest, players do not destroy in both the one sided 
and two sided Joy of Destruction Game. 
Proof. This follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2 by setting 
.0 jiND ssss  
 
We now want to try to formalize the intuition that, in the two sided game, we 
may expect higher destruction than in the one sided game again because of 
anticipated reciprocity, i.e. because each player expects the partner to destroy his or 
her earnings. 
 
Claim 4: If players expect partners to destroy, destruction is an equilibrium 
strategy in the two sided Joy of Destruction game even for parameter ranges where 
destruction is not a chosen strategy in the one sided Joy of Destruction game. 
Proof: Claim 1 implies that obedience is never observed for 01  whereas 
Claim 2 implies that also in the range )0  ,0( 21    (D, D) is an equilibrium.  
We note, however, that in the range ),0  ,0( 21    (N, N) is also an 
equilibrium. This is a useful point because it shows that, even for players caring 
about inequality aversion or reciprocity, it is not necessarily the case that behavior 
will be different in the two games.  
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The Repeated Game 
As described below, the repeated game (either one sided or two sided Joy of 
Destruction game) simply gives players who have not destroyed before an 
opportunity to destroy again. Subjects are explicitly told that the number of rounds 
is fixed and that they receive no feedback on what the partner has done, and vice 
versa. As such, no punishment strategy can be exploited and simple backwards 
induction shows that the claims above still apply.  
 
Figure 2. Experimental Design 
 
Notes. Each box represents an experimental treatment. R stands for Repeated, RO 
for Repeated Obedience, ROC for Repeated Obedience Constant pressure, RO1 for 
Repeated Obedience 1 sided and ROJ for Repeated Obedience Justified. 
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3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Outline 
The experiment was conducted at the  University of East Anglia between 
January and March 2012 with 350 subjects. The participants were mostly students 
with a variety of different backgrounds. The experiment was in paper and pencil. 
The instructions were as close as possible to those of Abbink and Herrmann (2011). 
The experiment employed a fictional currency, called Guilders, which was 
converted to pounds at the end of the experiment at the rate of £0.75 per Guilder. 
Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes and the subjects earned on average 
£8.06 (approximately 12.79 US dollars), including a show-up fee of £2.00. 
Earnings were paid privately and anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
Subjects were not allowed to participate in more than one session. Each session 
lasted approximately one hour. The experiment consisted of six treatments (see 
Table 1), described below: Open (O), Hidden (H), Repeated Interaction (R), 
Repeated Obedience (RO), Repeated Obedience Justified (ROJ), and Repeated 
Obedience 1-sided (RO1). We ran 18 sessions in total.
37
 
 
The Open and Hidden Treatments (O and H) 
We began with a straightforward replication of Abbink and Herrmann‟s 
(2011) two treatments. The O treatment was exactly as the two sided Joy of 
Destruction game described in section 2, except that there was no cue by the 
authority/experimenter. Two players were endowed with 10 Guilders each, and 
both players simultaneously decided whether or not to destroy 5 Guilders of the 
other player‟s endowment, at an own cost of 1 Guilder. If they both reduced their 
                                                     
37
 We aimed for (at least) 40 independent observations per treatment, which meant 40 subjects for 
the O, H and R treatment, and 80 subjects for the RO1 treatment (since, as discussed later, only half 
of the subjects made actual destruction decisions); as we were able to have a few more subjects, we 
had 56 subjects for the RO treatment and 54 for the ROC treatment.  
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partners‟ income, they both earned 4 Guilders. If one reduced his/her partner‟s 
income but the other did not, the first earned 9 Guilders and the second earned 5 
Guilders (and vice versa). If no one reduced the other person‟s income they both 
earned 10 Guilders. 
In the H treatment, a die was also rolled for each player. If it turned out 1 or 6 
(1/3 probability) the player would lose 5 Guilders regardless of the other player‟s 
decision; if the die turned out 2, 3, 4, or 5 (2/3 probability) the partner‟s decision 
was implemented.  A player who lost 5 Guilders was not told whether this was due 
to the partner‟s action, or because of the roll of the die. Abbink and Herrmann 
(2011) predicted that in the H treatment the destruction rate would be higher than in 
the O treatment, as the moral costs of nastiness would be decreased by the player 
being able to hide behind the possibility of destruction by nature and being able to 
reason that, had the player not destroyed, destruction may have occurred anyway. 
Define destruction rate the proportion of subjects who choose to destroy. Formally, 
in the H there is less of a social image utility gain from choosing N (not destroying) 
relative to the O treatment, i.e. Ns  is lower, increasing the parameters ranges where 
(D, D) is an equilibrium and (N, N) is not an equilibrium as per Claim 2. In Figure 
2, this corresponds to a move of the 01   and 02  thresholds to the left. 
As in Abbink and Herrmann (2011), after subjects had decided if they want to 
reduce their partner‟s income or not, we used an incentivized questionnaire in 
which we asked the participants about their expectation of their partner‟s behavior 
(i.e. their choice whether to destroy or not). If their prediction was correct they 
were rewarded with 1 Guilder.  
After the incentivized questionnaire and before subjects were informed about 
their earnings we requested them to complete two questionnaires. The first was a 
Social Desirability Scale questionnaire (Stöber, 2001) and the second collected 
demographic information.  
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The Repeated Interaction Treatment (R) 
The remaining treatments were identical to the O treatment except where 
otherwise specified below. In the Repeated Interaction (R) treatment the subjects 
were informed that the experiment consists of a predetermined amount of rounds 
although they will not be informed about the number of rounds until the end of the 
experiment. There were ten rounds.  
At the start of the first round subjects were asked if they wanted to reduce 
their partner‟s income at the cost of 1 Guilder. After all subjects made their choices, 
the experimenters would record their choices in a separate sheet of paper. If they 
decided to reduce their partner‟s income, they did not make any further decision 
within the game, i.e. in the remainder of the 10 rounds. If they decided not to 
reduce their partner‟s income, in the following round they were asked if they were 
sure that they did not want to change their choice (i.e. reduce their partner‟s 
income). This question was posed to the subjects until they either changed their 
choice or until the experiment reached the final round. No feedback on their choices 
was provided to, or received about the actions of their partners, in between rounds. 
Note that subjects could only destroy once throughout the game; once they 
chose to destroy, the game was effectively completed as far as they were concerned 
and they would have to wait.
38
 
The aim of this treatment was to control for the effect of having repeated 
rounds. If this has any effect, it can be expected to be in the direction of increasing 
destruction. This is because it seems to starts implicitly to build up on the pressure 
to destroy by repeating the question ten times. If effective, this mechanism would 
                                                     
38
 We asked subjects whether they would have been willing to reduce their partners‟ income for an 
additional 5 Guilders at the cost of 1 Guilder, but this was a purely hypothetical and unincentivized 
question. See appendix  for a brief analysis of the hypothetical responses 
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operate by raising Ds  in our model, increasing the parameters ranges where (D, D) 
is an equilibrium and (N, N) is not an equilibrium.
39
  
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher destruction rate is expected in the R treatment than in the O 
treatment.   
 
Repeated Obedience (RO) 
The Repeated Obedience (RO) treatment extends the R treatment. In this 
treatment, rounds 1, 4, 7 and 10 were marked with decision sheets provided on 
yellow paper. In this treatment the participant were told: “in the rounds with yellow 
instructions it would be especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s 
income if you have not done so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you 
wish.” 
This was the extent of the experimenter cue for the subject to obey. It was 
deliberately a subtle cue for three reasons. First, in many real world settings 
commands are phrased in similar equivalent subtle language, and we wanted our 
experiment to be applicable to more than contexts where a direct command is 
given. Second, and relatedly, by showing the impact of having a subtle cue, we are 
identifying lower bounds to what may be the real world effectiveness of direct 
commands. Third, when authority is implemented as an experimental demand as we 
do, a direct command may be problematic, since subjects may then be confused by 
the instructions in believing that they have no option but to destroy, thus 
confounding the results. We made instead explicit that subjects were entirely free 
not to destroy if so they wished, so as to dispel any potential confusion on the 
matter. 
                                                     
39
 While the decision problem is simple, additional destruction may also be due to any decision error 
that may occur, and this bias is also picked up by this treatment. Subjects who by mistake do not 
destroy can (up to round 9) correct their mistake in the following round or rounds. A decision to 
destroy instead cannot be reverted. 
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Unlike Milgram (1963, 1974) or Cadsby et al. (2006), we did not provide an 
explicit reason to destroy in this treatment, though our instructions focused subjects 
on destroying as being particularly useful in the „yellow rounds‟. As part of the end 
of experiment questionnaires, we did however add an open ended question, in 
which we asked the subjects what they believed was the scientific objective of the 
experiment. This question was provided in all the following treatments as well. 
We expect subjects to destroy more in the experiment as a result of the 
experimental authority cue being provided. Obedience to the cue, by destroying 
(particularly in the „yellow rounds‟), brings a higher utility Ds  out of social image 
towards the authority (or, equivalently, lower moral cost of destruction). 
Alternatively or in combination, if subjects anticipate obedience on the part of their 
partners, this could lead them to a (D, D) rather than a (N, N) equilibrium in the 
middle range of Figure 1 where both equilibria exist. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher destruction rate is expected in the RO treatment than in the 
R treatment. 
 
The remaining treatments extend the RO treatment in various ways and help 
us shed light on why, if Hypothesis 2 receives support, subjects appear willing to 
destroy half of their partner‟s earnings. Note, however, that there is no reason to 
expect inequality aversion, pure spite or joy of destruction to be different in this 
treatment from the previous ones, and so any change in destruction rate can be 
ascribed to the cue motivating subjects to obey via the increase in Ds , or 
alternatively (or in combination) leading to anticipated reciprocity. 
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Repeated Obedience Constant Pressure (ROC) 
The Repeated Obedience Constant pressure treatment (ROC) differs from the 
RO treatment in that the participants were told that “it would be especially useful if 
you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you have not done so already, you are 
entirely free not to reduce if you wish”. Rather than providing peak pressure to 
destroy at given points in time, a constant pressure to obey is provided over the ten 
rounds. We are therefore able to control for the effect of having „yellow rounds‟. 
We expect the destruction rate to be intermediate between the R treatment 
and the RO treatment. This is because there is a cue by an authority to destroy but 
without the peak psychological pressure, and corresponding social image utility Ds  
from destroying (and/or anticipated reciprocity), that is provided by having certain 
rounds as „yellow rounds‟. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher destruction rate is expected in the ROC treatment than in 
the R treatment. 
Hypothesis 4: A higher destruction rate is expected in the RO treatment than in the 
ROC treatment. 
 
Repeated Obedience Justified (ROJ) 
The Repeated Obedience Justified treatment (ROJ) differs from the RO 
treatment in that, in addition to the same cue as in the RO treatment, participants 
are told that reducing their partner‟s income “would help us achieve a scientific 
objective of the experiment”. Providing an explicit reason for destruction should 
increase destruction by increasing the moral legitimacy or providing an excuse, 
either way therefore increasing further the social image utility Ds  from obeying to 
the authority (and/or increasing the likelihood of anticipated reciprocity). We 
should, of course, also still expect destruction to be higher than in the R treatment.  
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Hypothesis 5: A higher destruction rate is expected in the ROJ treatment than in the 
RO treatment. 
Hypothesis 6: A higher destruction rate is expected in the ROJ treatment than in the 
R treatment. 
   
Repeated Obedience 1-sided (RO1) 
 The Repeated Obedience 1-sided treatment (RO1) differs from the RO 
treatment in that half of the subjects were active and half were passive (though this 
terminology was not used in the instructions). Each active subject was matched 
with a passive partner but only the active subject made destruction decisions within 
the game, and this was known. Specifically, active subjects were told that “your 
partner answers some hypothetical questions but makes no decisions affecting your 
or his or her earnings”. 
The RO1 treatment tests whether the cue by the authority induces destruction 
because of anticipated reciprocity. If destruction is entirely driven by an 
unconditional desire to obey out of social image concerns as modeled in a higher 
,Ds  there is no reason to expect RO1 destruction to differ from RO destruction. 
This is because the threshold 1  above which destruction is strictly dominant and so 
independent of expectations about the partner in the two sided game, as per Claim 
2, is the same threshold above which obedience takes place in the one sided game 
as per Claim 1. 
Hypothesis 7: The same destruction rate is to be expected in the RO and RO1 
treatments. 
We have shown with Claim 4, however, how anticipated reciprocity 
potentially triggers destruction under a wider range of parameter combinations in 
the two sided game than in the one sided game. This is because, within the range 
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)0  ,0( 21   , (D, D) is an equilibrium enforced by the belief that the partner 
will destroy. 
Hypothesis 8: A higher destruction rate is expected in the RO treatment than in the 
RO1 treatment. 
As no anticipatory retaliation was possible in this treatment, there was no 
question regarding expected destruction from the partner at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
4. Results  
Figure 3. Destruction Rates accross Treatments 
 
Figure 3 presents the average destruction rate across treatments. Table 2 
presents the results of Probit regressions on whether subjects choose to destroy (=1) 
or not (=0) and their implications in terms of overall winning probabilities for each 
treatment. The regressions employ dummy variables for the experimental 
treatments; the RO treatment was used as baseline. SocialDesirability is our 
questionnaire social desirability measure for sensitivity to social pressure, and some 
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demographic variables are included as controls. We now consider the hypotheses 
and the key evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 b se p b se p 
O -1.789**** 0.37 0.000 -1.732**** 0.37 0.000 
H -1.413**** 0.30 0.000 -1.430**** 0.31 0.000 
R -1.220**** 0.30 0.000 -1.120**** 0.30 0.000 
ROJ   0.219 0.27 0.422   0.249 0.27 0.365 
RO1 -0.058 0.27 0.831 -0.046 0.27 0.868 
ROC -0.493** 0.25 0.049 -0.475* 0.25 0.060 
SDS17 Score      0.053** 0.02 0.041 
British -0.290 0.21 0.169 -0.249 0.21 0.245 
Chinese -0.216 0.26 0.406 -0.293 0.27 0.282 
Gender   0.227 0.16 0.162   0.194 0.16 0.653 
Age -0.008 0.02 0.661 -0.007 0.02 0.688 
Economics -0.186 0.22 0.403 -0.148 0.03 0.505 
Christian -0.429* 0.31 0.098 -0.368 0.04 0.236 
Atheist -0.496 0.30 0.136 -0.440 0.05 0.136 
Muslim   0.006 0.46 0.990   0.002 0.06 0.997 
Constant   0.813** 0.35 0.021   0.746** 0.35 0.032 
N 310   310   
Pseudo R-sqr 0.199   0.207   
Prob > Χ
2
 0.000   0.000   
 Marginal Effects given 
Regression 1 
Marginal Effects given 
Regression 2 
 b se p b se p 
O 0.074* 0.04 0.076 0.081* 0.04 0.070 
H 0.139*** 0.05 0.008 0.134*** 0.05 0.008 
R 0.185*** 0.06 0.003 0.187*** 0.06 0.003 
RO 0.611**** 0.06 0.000 0.601**** 0.06 0.000 
ROJ 0.690**** 0.07 0.000 0.690**** 0.07 0.000 
RO1 0.589**** 0.08 0.000 0.584**** 0.07 0.000 
ROC 0.422**** 0.07 0.000 0.422**** 0.06 0.000 
Notes: Probit regressions with robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01, **** 
p<0.001.  Other than treatment variables, regressions include age (subtracted from mean age), gender 
(=1 for women), economics background (=1 if applicable), nationality (British=1 for British subjects, 
and Chinese =1 for Chinese subjects), religion (Christian = 1 for Christian subjects, Atheist =1 for 
atheist and agnostic subjects and Muslim = 1 for Muslim subjects). SocialDesirability includes a 
measure of social desirability.  
Table 2. Regressions on destruction rate  
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Result 1: Against Hypothesis 1, there is no statistically significant difference 
between destruction rates in the O and the R treatments. 
Evidence: R destruction is roughly the same as those in the H treatment and 
both are qualitatively above O, which is what we would expect. However, a Wald 
test for whether the coefficient on R is the same as the coefficient on O is not 
statistically significant for both Regression 1 (p = 0.15) and 2 (p = 0.18). The same 
result can be obtained in a simple bivariate test by comparing destruction rate 
proportions in the two treatments using a Fisher‟s exact test (p = 0.16).40 Overall, 
repeating the question again and again does not make much difference, with the 
destruction rate remaining below 20%. 
 
Result 2: In support of Hypothesis 2, the destruction rate is statistically 
significantly higher in the RO treatment than in the R treatment. The difference is 
large. 
Evidence: Figure 2 shows how the destruction rate more than triples in 
moving from the R treatment (17.5%) to the RO treatment (58.9%). This is 
significant in a bivariate Fisher‟s exact test (p < 0.001). In the regression analysis, 
the coefficients on R are negative and statistically significant in both regressions 1 
(p < 0.001) and 2 (p < 0.001). 
 
Result 3: In support of Hypothesis 3, the destruction rate is statistically 
significantly higher in the ROC treatment than in the R treatment. The difference is 
large. 
Evidence: Figure 2 shows how the ROC destruction rate is intermediate 
(42.6%) between R and RO, but more than double than that in R. A bivariate 
                                                     
40
 All p values reported in this paper are two tailed. 
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Fisher‟s exact test is significant (p = 0.04) and, in our regression analysis, Wald 
tests also achieve significance in both regressions 1 (p = 0.02) and 2 (p = 0.01). 
 
Result 4: In support of Hypothesis 4, the destruction rate is statistically 
significantly higher in the ROC treatment than in the RO treatment. 
Evidence: As shown by Figure 3, quantitatively, the destruction rate in RO 
is about 16% more than in ROC, suggesting that providing peak pressure at 
intervals makes a difference. A bivariate Fisher‟s exact test yields p = 0.06. In the 
regression analysis, controlling for SocialDesirability the coefficient on the ROC 
dummy has p = 0.06 (Regression 2); without this variable, which may be picking 
up some of the extra effect in RO, we have p = 0.049 (Regression 1). Although 
obviously less overwhelming than for Result 2 and 3, and bearing in mind that 
these are two tailed p tests whereas Hypothesis 4 is one-tailed, there is support for 
peak pressure at intervals having induced greater destruction. The supplementary 
analysis of section 4.2 will provide complementary evidence.   
 
Result 5: Against Hypothesis 5, there is no statistically significant difference 
between destruction rates in the RO and the ROJ treatments. 
Evidence: While the destruction rate is as high as 70.7% in the ROJ 
treatment, the difference from the RO treatment is not enough to achieve statistical 
significance either in a bivariate Fisher‟s exact test (p = 0.18) or in the regression 
analysis by looking at the coefficient on the ROJ dummy (p = 0.42 in Regression 1 
and p = 0.37 in Regression 2). Providing an explicit reason for destruction does not 
seem to make a difference. 
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Result 6: In support of Hypothesis 6, the destruction rate is statistically 
significantly higher in the ROJ treatment than in the R treatment. The difference is 
large. 
Evidence: The destruction rate is about five times as high in the ROJ 
treatment as in the R treatment. In the light of Result 3, it should then come to no 
surprise that this difference is statistically significant in a bivariate Fisher‟s exact 
test (p < 0.001) or in the regression analysis, where Wald tests for whether the 
coefficients on the ROJ dummy are equal to those on the R dummy yield p < 0.001 
for both Regressions 1 and 2. 
 
Result 7: In support of Hypothesis 7 and against Hypothesis 8, there is no 
statistically significant difference between destruction rates in the RO and the RO1 
treatments. 
Evidence: Figure 3 already provides the answer by showing virtually 
identical destruction rates (60% in RO1 vs. 58.9% in RO), not statistically 
significantly different in a bivariate Fisher‟s exact test (p = 0.51). The 
insignificance of the RO1 dummy in Regressions 1 (p = 0.83) and 2 (p = 0.87) 
further confirm this. Overall, this points to obedience to authority rather than 
anticipated reciprocity by partners as the driver of destruction.
41
  
 
 
                                                     
41
 It is interesting to compare and contrast our simple between treatments test on anticipation of 
reciprocity with the use of belief elicitation data, which we also collected at the end of the 
experiment for all treatments other than RO1 (where it obviously could not be formulated). There 
tends to be a positive correlation between destruction and stated belief about the destruction of the 
other partner, though there is no clear pattern to it across treatments (Spearman ρ = 0.854, - 0.009, 
0.223, 0.297, 0.480, 0.180, respectively with p < 0.001, p =  0.96, 0.17, 0.03, < 0.01, and = 0.195 in 
treatments 0, H, R, RO, ROJ and ROC respectively). It is possible that having decided to destroy 
might make it more likely for subjects to believe the partner will, e.g. out of self-image and 
cognitive dissonance concerns. 
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Supplementary Analysis 
The only other finding from Table 2 is that SocialDesirability predicts greater 
destruction (p = 0.04). The result supports the interpretation of destruction as 
obedience to social pressure from the authority. Demographic variables are 
generally insignificant. 
Time of destruction. It is interesting to see when the decision to destroy takes 
place over the ten rounds of most treatments (i.e., all treatments other than O and 
H). Figure 4 presents destruction rates per round for the „yellow rounds‟ repeated 
play treatments where peak pressure is applied to destroy at given points in time 
(RO, ROJ, and RO1) and for treatments where constant pressure was applied (R 
and ROC). Note that subjects can only destroy once, and therefore those who have 
already destroyed in the early rounds cannot destroy further in the following 
rounds; effectively, later decisions are conditional on not having destroyed before, 
reflecting a sample selection increasingly composed of subjects who are less 
willing to obey the experimental cue provided.  
  
Round R RO ROJ RO1 ROC 
1 5.00% 25.00% 37.50% 25.00% 16.00% 
2 2.63% 8.69% 15.38% 6.67% 11.11% 
3 5.40% 9.52% 13.64% 14.30% 7.50% 
4 0.00% 18.42% 26.31% 25.00% 10.81% 
 
Notes: The destruction rate in round 1 is the proportion of all subjects who have 
destroyed in round 1. The destruction rates for rounds 2, 3 and 4 are conditional on 
the destruction in the previous rounds: specifically, they are the proportions of all 
subjects who have destroyed in the given round conditional on them not having 
destroyed in the previous round(s). 
Table 3. Destruction rates in each round
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Figure 4 shows that almost all of the destruction takes places by the 4
th
 round, 
and Table 3 provides a breakdown of destruction rates (conditional on the previous 
round‟s destruction from round 2 onwards) up to round 4. Despite the declining 
trend across rounds due to early decisions to destroy and sample selection, in the 
„yellow rounds‟ treatments with peaks in pressure to destroy there is a spike in 
destruction rates in round 4. This is in line with our expectations, and complements 
Result 4 above, as round 4 was one of the rounds in which we asked the subjects 
explicitly to reduce their partners‟ income. 
 
Figure 4. Destruction Rates per Round 
 
Notes. Yellow stands for treatments with „yellow rounds‟ RO, ROJ and RO1. Non-
Yellow stands for treatments R and ROC. 
 
Focusing on round 1, and in the lack of any peak pressure, round 1 
destruction is not dissimilar between R and ROC and the one side and O (or H) on 
the other side. As subjects know that there are multiple rounds, subjects can, of 
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course, choose to defer destruction to after round 1, and a majority does so, 
particularly though by no means exclusively in both R and ROC, the treatments 
with repeated but constant pressure to obey.
42 
Qualitative data. As noted earlier, in the treatments with an explicit cue by 
the authority/experimenter to destroy (RO, ROC, RO1 and ROJ), at the end of the 
experiment we asked subjects what they thought the objective of the experiment 
was.
43
 The answers were then grouped in categories by research assistants 
themselves not informed of the objectives of the experiment.
44
  
The answers of the subjects were divided into 7 broad categories: authority / 
effect of yellow instructions, willingness to reduce the others payoff at an own 
sacrifice, selfishness vs cooperation, trust, attitudes towards social and strategic 
interaction, and change in behavior over time, and rest.
45
 Figure 5 displays the 
results of the classification. 
Unsurprisingly, while between 15% and 30% of the subjects in the treatments 
with „yellow rounds‟ peaks of pressure picked „authority/effect of yellow 
instructions‟ as the objective of the experiment, less than 5% did so in the ROC 
                                                     
42
 We ran Probit regression analysis specifically on round 1 destruction (see appendix B). The 
coefficients on the O and R dummies are negative and statistically significant relative to the RO 
baseline; that on H is not. 
43
 Such data obviously has limitations, as discussed in Zizzo (2010). 
44
 The answers were first grouped into categories by a research assistant with no prior knowledge of 
the aims of the experiment or experimental design. Afterwards a second research assistant, with no 
prior knowledge of the aims of the experiment, received the previously created seven categories 
along with the subjects‟ responses and was asked to independently match every answer with one of 
the categories. Finally, the assistants have met up to reconcile any discrepancy. 
45
 Authority / effect of yellow instructions referred to subjects who believed that the aim of the 
experiment was either the influence of authority upon them or the influence of the „yellow paper‟ 
rounds. Willingness to reduce the others payoff at own sacrifice saw the experiment being about 
subjects reducing their partner‟s income despite there was no monetary incentive for them to do so. 
Selfishness / cooperation referred to whether people are selfish or willing to cooperate. Similarly, 
Trust was about subjects being able to trust each other not to destroy. Attitudes towards social and 
strategic interaction was about when subjects argued that the aim of the experiment relates to 
strategic behavior, either on what the other subject will do or what he or she would do if he or she 
was in their place (RO1 treatment). Change in behavior over time answers were about the 
experiment being about change in choice if they are asked repetitively if they will change their 
choice. Rest was the residual category and included non-responders. 
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treatment with constant pressure and no „yellow rounds‟.46 The modal answer in 
ROC switched to „selfishness/ cooperation‟, again a plausible response insofar as 
subjects can avoid destroying each other.
47
 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of qualitative responses per category for each treatment 
 
Notes. The responses were to a question on what subjects thought was the objective 
of the experiment.  
 
 
There seem to be three useful messages from the qualitative data. First, all of 
the six substantive categories pick up on potentially relevant aspects of the decision 
problem, displaying no evidence of confusion about the decision problem. Second, 
we had no evidence, either from these categories or looking at the residual 
category, of subjects wanting to destroy money in order to indirectly return money 
                                                     
46
 The difference between the ROC and the remaining treatments is statistically significant (Fisher 
exact tests, p = 0.017, 0.014 and < 0.001 for RO, ROJ and RO1 respectively). 
47
 This difference is also statistically significant across all treatments (Fisher‟s exact tests, p = 0.024 
p = 0.007 p = 0.078 for RO, ROJ and RO1 respectively). 
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to the experimenter, which would be a kind of house money effect. Third, there is 
no evidence that subjects wanted to be altruistic towards the experimenter as such; 
the focus even of the answers classified as related to „selfishness/cooperation‟ was 
with respect to partners. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our results suggest that even a limited (rather than Milgram style) cue from 
the authority, without an explicit justification, can induce obedience on the part of 
some 60% of the subjects to halve the earnings of a partner at a cost to their own. A 
deliberate and explicit experimenter demand (Zizzo, 2010) was used as a tool to 
study the effect of authority, with the authority being the experimenter. In this 
sense, our study also checked how far one can go with experimenter demand when 
cues less explicit than making vocal demands to obey are used.  
Our 60% destruction rate under obedience compares with previous 
experiments on antisocial behavior that have achieved destruction rates ranging 
from approximately 10-40%  using methods such as the ability to hide due to 
random destruction (Abbink and Hermann, 2011; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2007) or the 
introduction of pointless prizes (Abbink and Hermann, 2009). Our results are made 
stronger by the fact that, while unequivocal, our cue was not phrased directly; 
indirect cues of this kind are arguably pervasive in workplaces and help us avoid 
the potential criticism that subjects did not understand that they had a choice not to 
destroy. Our results cannot be explained by purely repeating the task again and 
again, since by doing so destruction rates remain below 20%. They also cannot be 
explained by reciprocal expectations of destruction from the partner, since, even in 
the absence of the possibility of reciprocity, we observe around a 60% destruction 
rate. Providing pressure at peak intervals does help the authority to induce more 
obedience, but giving an explicit reason does not yield to a statistically significant 
increase. Our qualitative data suggests that subjects generally did understand the 
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nature of the task and that they did not care about returning money to the 
experimenter. They do not more generally seem to suggest, within the range of 
motivations, that subjects wanted to be pro-social towards the experimenter as such. 
Of course, qualitative data has limitations and should be taken with caution. 
Using our conceptual framework provided in section 2, changes in ,Ds  the 
social image towards the authority parameter, appear to drive the results. Because 
of the anti-social  nature of the action to be undertaken by the agent, namely to 
destroy half of their partner‟s earnings, which goes against the standard social norm 
not to cause unnecessary harm to others, we can say that changes in Ds reflect 
social image concerns towards the authority as opposed to simply reflect an 
enhanced social norm. The cue by the authority minimizes the moral cost of 
destruction and enhances the desire to obey the authority as a way of maximizing 
social image utility. While this chapter has treated social image utility 
maximization and moral cost of destruction minimization as equivalent, and 
correspondingly modeled them with a single parameter, further research could try 
to disentangle the two. Overall, our experiment suggests that obedience should not 
be neglected in principal agent modeling, nor should it be neglected as a powerful 
managerial and social tool; in this sense, the emphasis by Cialdini and Goldstein 
(2004) on the role of compliance to authority in organizations appears well placed. 
It is arguable that, even in the lack of economic incentives, individuals may tend at 
least to some degree to obey orders, and that this is exploited by economic 
organizations big and small as a management tool. For example, it may help 
strategic delegation which is advantageous to principals in handling conflict and 
contests (Warneryd, 2012). 
  That said, where authority is in the wrong hands, cues to engage in 
aggressive or harassing behavior do not have to go as far as giving explicit orders. 
Of this too there seems to be evidence in organizations (Ashford and Anand, 2001; 
Brief et al., 2001; Darley, 2001). Saint Teresa of Avila (1972) may have been right 
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in stating that obedience is powerful in making things easy which seem impossible; 
but the things it makes easy may or may not be socially desirable, and trying to 
understand how it operates appears relevant.
48
  The converse of our finding, of 
course, is that some 30-40% of subjects were resistant to the cues by the authority, 
even when repeated ten times, under intervals of peak pressure and with an explicit 
justification, and this heterogeneity in the willingness to obey orders is something 
worth further attention too. 
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Appendix  
 
A. Experimental Instructions 
 
Instructions (R Treatment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
 
You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
 
In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds. You will not 
learn the outcome of the decisions of your partner until the end of the experiment, 
and vice versa your partner will not learn the outcome of your decisions until the 
end of the experiment. 
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. You then have to 
decide whether to reduce your partner's income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
partner's income will cost you 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, you can reduce the 
other partner's income by 5 Guilders. Your partner simultaneously takes the same 
decision. He can choose between leaving your income unaltered, or reducing it by 5 
Guilders. Your partner will incur the same cost - 1 Guilders - if he or she chooses to 
reduce your income  
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If both of you choose to leave the other person's income unaltered, both of you will 
earn the 10 Guilders.  
If both of you choose to reduce the other person's income, both of you will earn 4 
Guilders (10-5-1).  
If you choose to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to leave your 
income unaltered, you will earn 9 Guilders and your partner will earn 5 Guilders.  
If you choose not to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to reduce 
yours, you will earn 5 Guilders and your partner will earn 9 Guilders.  
 
Instructions (RO Treatment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
 
You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
 
In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds. You will not 
learn the outcome of the decisions of your partner until the end of the experiment. 
and vice versa your partner will not learn the outcome of your decisions until the 
end of the experiment. 
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. You then have to 
decide whether to reduce your partner's income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
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partner's income will cost you 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, you can reduce the 
other partner's income by 5 Guilders. Your partner simultaneously takes the same 
decision. He can choose between leaving your income unaltered, or reducing it by 5 
Guilders. Your partner will incur the same cost - 1 Guilders - if he or she chooses to 
reduce your income  
 
If both of you choose to leave the other person's income unaltered, both of you will 
earn the 10 Guilders.  
If both of you choose to reduce the other person's income, both of you will earn 4 
Guilders (10-5-1).  
If you choose to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to leave your 
income unaltered, you will earn 9 Guilders and your partner will earn 5 Guilders.  
If you choose not to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to reduce 
yours, you will earn 5 Guilders and your partner will earn 9 Guilders.  
 
Some of these predetermined rounds will be marked with yellow instructions; this 
is instructions in yellow paper. In the rounds with yellow instructions it would be 
especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you have not done 
so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish.  
 
Instructions (ROC Treatment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
 
You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
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In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds. You will not 
learn the outcome of the decisions of your partner until the end of the experiment, 
and vice versa your partner will not learn the outcome of your decisions until the 
end of the experiment. 
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. You then have to 
decide whether to reduce your partner's income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
partner's income will cost you 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, you can reduce the 
other partner's income by 5 Guilders. Your partner simultaneously takes the same 
decision. He can choose between leaving your income unaltered, or reducing it by 5 
Guilders. Your partner will incur the same cost - 1 Guilders - if he or she chooses to 
reduce your income  
 
If both of you choose to leave the other person's income unaltered, both of you will 
earn the 10 Guilders.  
If both of you choose to reduce the other person's income, both of you will earn 4 
Guilders (10-5-1).  
If you choose to reduce your partner's income, but he or she decides to leave your 
income unaltered, you will earn 9 Guilders and your partner will earn 5 Guilders.  
If you choose not to reduce your partner's income, but he or she decides to reduce 
yours, you will earn 5 Guilders and your partner will earn 9 Guilders.  
 
It would be especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you 
have not done so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish.  
 
Instructions (ROJ Treatment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
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You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
 
In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds. You will not 
learn the outcome of the decisions of your partner until the end of the experiment, 
and vice versa your partner will not learn the outcome of your decisions until the 
end of the experiment. 
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. You then have to 
decide whether to reduce your partner's income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
partner's income will cost you 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, you can reduce the 
other partner's income by 5 Guilders. Your partner simultaneously takes the same 
decision. He can choose between leaving your income unaltered, or reducing it by 5 
Guilders. Your partner will incur the same cost - 1 Guilders - if he or she chooses to 
reduce your income  
 
If both of you choose to leave the other person's income unaltered, both of you will 
earn the 10 Guilders.  
If both of you choose to reduce the other person's income, both of you will earn 4 
Guilders (10-5-1).  
If you choose to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to leave your 
income unaltered, you will earn 9 Guilders and your partner will earn 5 Guilders.  
If you choose not to reduce your partner's income, but he/she decides to reduce 
yours, you will earn 5 Guilders and your partner will earn 9 Guilders.  
 
Some of these predetermined rounds will be marked with yellow instructions; this 
is instructions in yellow paper. In the rounds with yellow instructions it would be 
especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you have not done 
so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish. However if you do it 
would help achieving a scientific objective of the experiment. 
 
Instructions (RO1 Treatment – active subjects) 
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Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
 
You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
 
In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds.  
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. You then have to 
decide whether to reduce your partner's income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
partner's income will cost you 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, you can reduce your 
partner's income by 5 Guilders. Your partner answers some hypothetical questions 
but makes no decisions affecting your or his or her earnings. 
 
If you choose to leave the other person's income unaltered, both of you will earn the 
10 Guilders.  
If you choose to reduce your partner's income you will earn 9 Guilders and your 
partner will earn 5 Guilders. 
 
Some of these predetermined rounds will be marked with yellow instructions; this 
is instructions in yellow paper. In the rounds with yellow instructions it would be 
especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you have not done 
so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish.  
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Instructions (RO1 - passive subjects) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 hour. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, 
depending on your own decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is not allowed to communicate 
with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions, 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the 
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. 
 
You will be paid after the experiment. No other participant will know how much 
you earned. You will be paid £2 for showing up plus any additional earnings that 
you have in the experiment.  
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be 
converted into cash at the end of today‟s session, using an exchange rate of 1 
Guilder = £0.75.  
 
In the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant – your 
partner. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched with, and 
vice versa your partner will never learn about your identity.  
 
The experiment has a fixed and predetermined number of rounds. 
 
You and your partner both receive an endowment of 10 Guilders. Your partner has 
to decide whether to reduce your income or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
income will cost him or her 1 Guilder. By paying 1 Guilder, he or she can reduce 
your income by 5 Guilders. You are asked to answer hypothetical questions where 
you simultaneously take the same decision but your decision does not count 
towards your or his/her earnings.  
 
If he or she chooses to leave your income unaltered, both of you will earn the 10 
Guilders.  
If he or she chooses to reduce your income he/she will earn 9 Guilders and you will 
earn 5 Guilders. 
 
Some of these predetermined rounds will be marked with yellow instructions; this 
is instructions in yellow paper. In the rounds with yellow instructions it would be 
especially useful if you were to reduce your partner‟s income if you have not done 
so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish.  
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B. Number of Decisions to Destroy per Round by Treatment 
 
Below we used „number of destructions‟ as a shortcut for „number of decisions to 
destroy‟. 
 
Number of Destructions per Round in the R Treatment 
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Number of Destructions per Round in the RO Treatment 
 
 
Number of Destructions per Round in the ROC Treatment 
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Number of Destructions per Round in the ROJ Treatment 
 
 
Number of Destructions per Round in the RO1 Treatment 
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C. Round 1 Decisions 
Table C1 provides information on first round destruction rates across 
treatments. the effect of the request to destroy is significantly larger even for the 
first round in „yellow round‟ treatments for the RO, ROJ and RO1 treatments when 
these are compared to the O or R treatments (Fisher‟s exact test p < 0.05, p < 0.01 
and  p < 0.05 respectively), noting that round 1 was a „yellow round‟. There is no 
statistically significant difference in first round destruction rate between the ROC 
and the O and a weakly statistically significant difference between ROC and R 
treatments instead (Fisher‟s exact test p = 0.16 and p = 0.07 respectively). 
Regression C2 below provides Probit regressions on whether a destruction 
decision in round 1, bearing in mind that in treatments O and H there is not the 
possibility to delay destruction whereas this can take place in the other treatments. 
There is some mild evidence (p < 0.1) that economics students chose to destroy less 
in round 1, though they did not manage to keep this up overall (see Table 2 in main 
paper). 
 
 
Treatment 
First Round 
Destruction Rate 
(FRDR) 
FRDR as a % of 
Overall Treatment 
Destruction Rate 
O 7.5% 100% 
H 15.0% 100% 
R 5.0% 28% 
RO 25.0% 42% 
ROJ 37.5% 53% 
RO1 25.0% 42% 
ROC 16.0% 39% 
 
  
Table C1: Destruction rates in the first round 
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 Regression C1 Regression C2 
 b se p b se p 
O -0.780** 0.36 0.030 -0.765** 0.36 0.034 
H -0.399 0.31 0.193 -0.402 0.31 0.190 
R -1.001*** 0.37 0.007 -0.994*** 0.37 0.007 
ROJ 0.361 0.28 0.192 0.364 0.28 0.190 
RO1 0.033 0.29 0.910 0.036 0.29 0.904 
ROC -0.284 0.25 0.308 -0.286 0.25 0.305 
British -0.311 0.22 0.151 -0.299 0.22 0.171 
Chinese -0.261 0.28 0.354 -0.280 0.29 0.334 
Gender 0.061 0.17 0.713 0.051 0.17 0.764 
Age -0.023 0.02 0.281 -0.220 0.02 0.287 
Economics -0.497* 0.27 0.065 -0.480* 0.27 0.073 
Christian -0.278 0.36 0.442 -0.261 0.36 0.471 
Atheist -0.361 0.35 0.302 -0.346 0.35 0.324 
Muslim -0.873 0.65 0.181 -0.876 0.65 0.181 
Constant -0.119 0.38 0.754 0.135 0.38 0.724 
N 310   310   
Pseudo R-sqr 0.098   0.098   
Prob > Χ
2
 0.011   0.016   
 Marginal Effects given 
Regression 1 
Marginal Effects given 
Regression 2 
 b se p b se p 
O 0.074* 0.04 0.076 0.077* 0.04 0.067 
H 0.139*** 0.05 0.008 0.142*** 0.05 0.007 
R 0.185*** 0.06 0.003 0.050 0.03 0.125 
RO 0.611**** 0.06 0.000 0.247**** 0.06 0.000 
ROJ 0.690**** 0.07 0.000 0.370**** 0.08 0.000 
RO1 0.589**** 0.08 0.000 0.258**** 0.07 0.000 
ROC 0.422**** 0.07 0.000 0.168*** 0.05 0.001 
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D. Fictional Destruction 
D1. Fictional Further Destruction 
Subjects who decided to reduce their partner‟s income were afterwards asked 
hypothetically if there would be willing to reduce their partner‟s income by an 
additional 5 ECU leading them to earn 0 ECU from this experiment.  Note that 
fictional destruction could only take place in treatments with repeated interaction: 
the R, RO, ROJ, RO1 and ROC treatments.  
Table D1 presents the average fictional destruction rates for each treatment. 
The middle column shows the percentage of subjects who where willing to destroy 
their partner‟s income even further according to their response on the hypothetical 
question. The last column shows the percentage of subjects who answered yes on 
the hypothetical question among all subjects who participated in the treatment.   
Figure 9 provides a visual representation. 
 
 
Treatment 
Across subjects 
who have 
already 
destroyed 
Across all 
subjects in 
treatment 
R 83.0% 12.5% 
RO 71.9% 42.3% 
ROJ 96.4% 67.5% 
RO1 65.2% 39.1% 
ROC 78.3% 33.3% 
 
Note that this data is of very limited value in across treatments comparisons, 
both because of its fictional nature, and because one cannot disambiguate what is 
due to treatment specific effects and what is due to sample selection of subjects 
who have already destroyed, and who are in different proportions in the different 
Table D1: Fictional Destruction Rates 
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treatments. There is some evidence that, for subjects who were given a explicit 
reason to destroy (ROJ), the fictional further destruction is significantly larger than 
when no explicitly justification is provided (RO) (Fisher‟s exact test p = 0.01). 
 
D2. Fictional Destruction Rates of Passive Subjects in the RO1 Treatment 
Passive subjects in the RO1 treatment were asked to make fictional 
destruction choices, fully aware that their choices had no bearing on the actual 
game being played; if they said they would have destroyed, they were then asked a 
second time whether they would be willing to engage in further fictional destruction 
of another 5 pounds of the partner. Table D2 below compares the average 
destruction rate for the RO1 Treatment for both passive and active subjects, and for 
both the first time (real for active subjects, fictional for passive subjects) and for the 
second time (fictional for all). The patterns are clearly quite similar, with no 
statistical significance between groups for both the first and second destruction 
choice (Fisher‟s exact test p = 0.41 and p = 0.96 respectively).  
 
 
 
Treatment 
Destruction 
choice (1
st
 time) 
Destruction 
choice (2
nd
  
time) 
Active Subjects 60.0% 65.2% 
Passive Subjects 55.0% 47.5% 
 
 
 
 
Table D2: Fictional Destruction Rates in the RO1 Treatment  
(as a proportion of all active subjects or of all passive subjects) 
